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INTRODUCTION

The portfolio ownership of firms by institutional investors is
not in itself a recent or recently noticed phenomenon. The "re* Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley, School of Law (Boalt Hall).
This is an augmented version of a paper given as the Fourth Pomerantz Lecture at
Brooklyn Law School in November of 1990, and retains the lecture style of that presentation. Material appearing since the end of 1990 has been only partially worked into the
present article. I wish to thank the panelists and other participants at the lecture for
their stimulating submissions, Professor Theodor Baums, OsnabrQck (Visiting Scholar at
Boalt Hall 1990-1991), for many helpful and critical review sessions, Professor Ronald
Gilson, Stanford, for comments all the more helpful because of his disagreement with the
premises for some of my proposals, and Dr. Christian Hammerl, LL.M. 1989, Michelle
Thomas, LL.M. 1991, and Daniela Feldhausen, J.D. candidate, (all Boalt Hall) for their
substantial research support. A grant to the Corporate Governance Project of the Earl
Warren Legal Institute (Boalt Hall) from the California Public Employee Retirement
System (CalPERS) underwrote much of the research for this paper.
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markable" increase in institutional ownership of United States
equities from 7.6 percent in 1900 to over 20 percent in 1950 was
duly noted during the latter decade.' At that time, however, the
concern, understandably, was with the concentration of ownership, and in particular of management of these
assets, in banks
2
and other traditional financial institutions.
What has changed is the further transfer of ownership from
these traditional intermediary structures directly to the beneficiaries or ultimate owners of these financial assets, or at least to
other types of intermediaries whose relations with their portfolio
firms are less symbiotic and less intimate than were these earlier
relationships. This specifically new phenomenon, first brought to
general public attention by Peter Drucker almost fifteen years
ago, is a topic whose time has come, though the recognition of
that fact is relatively recent. Half a decade passed after the publication of his book, The Unseen Revolution,3 with its announcement of the arrival of "pension plan socialism,"'4 before Clark's
even terser pronouncements on "the four stages of capitalism"
appeared; 5 and it took another five years for legal analysts to
catch up with financial theorists in recognizing the normative
significance of these phenomena6
Now, however, the outpouring of legal commentary is in full
flood;7 and if I add yet another comment to its waves, it is to
I

See R. GOLDSMITH, FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY SINCE

1900 (1958).
2 See R.

TILOVE, PENSION FUNDS AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM:

A REPORT TO THE FUND

FOR THE REPUBLIC 29, 39, 55 (1959).
3 P. DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN REVOLUTION: How PENSION PLAN SOCIALISM CAME TO

AMERICA (1976).

" Hardly the characterization a socialist would use, however; see particularly the
massive study of R.L. DEATON, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PENSIONS (1989), incorporating British, Canadian, and American experience; see also R. MINNS, PENSION FUNDS AND
BRITISH CAPITALISM: THE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF SHAREHOLDINGS

(1980). For

an-

other (American) view of the phenomenon, see J. RIFKIN & R. BARBER, THE NORTH WILL
RISE AGAIN: PENSIONS, POLITICS AND POWER IN THE 1980s (1978).

1 Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment Management
Treatises, 94 HARv. L. REV. 561 (1981).
0 The overview in R. IPPOLITO, PENSIONS. ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1986) analyzes in economic terms a process analyzed in legal terms in B. KRIKORIAN, FIDUCIARY
STANDARDS IN PENSION AND TRUST FUND MANAGEMENT (1989); see also Conard, Beyond
Managerialism:Investor Capitalism?,22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 117 (1988).
See especially the papers presented at the Salomon Brothers Center and Rutgers
Center Conference on the Fiduciary Responsibility of Institutional Investors (June 1415, 1990) [hereinafter.Salomon/Rutgers Conference].
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highlight the one element not yet acknowledged in these writings, namely, the transnational aspects attendant on the globalization of securities markets and the global reach of these American-and, to a lesser extent, Japanese and British-institutional investments outside their countries of origin, especially
on the European continent.'
Because of the implications of these institutional investments for the merger and takeover movement of the 1980s, most
of the discussion of the role of institutional ownership has focused on the relation of these holders to management-that is,
to the "corporate governance" issue. The critical aspect of that
general issue has been the role of these investors as voters, and
their analogous role as passive or even as active participants in
the market for corporate control-that is, in takeover, management-buyout, and defensive recapitalization transactions. The
current ebb in that market's volume of transactions, however,
permits attention to be shifted to reflection on longer range, less
transaction-specific trends and issues in this new setting of institutional ownership of equities.9 Specifically, it facilitates a look
not only at chronic rather than acute corporate governance issues, but also at the "front end" issues that are related to the
evolution and internal structures of these institutional invest10
ment vehicles themselves.
The broadening of portfolio distribution that accompanies
absolute growth in the size of these investment pools makes the
comparative as well as the transnational aspect of this new investment situation a major issue in its own right.11 The following

8 See also Buxbaum, Institutional Ownership and the Restructuring of Corporations, in FESCHRiFr FOR ERNST STEINDORFF 7 (J. Baur, K. Hopt & P. Mailinder eds.
1990); Schneider, Auf dem Weg in den Pensionskassenkorporatismus?,37 DIE AvnmNGESELLSCHAFr 317 (1990).
9 See also, from this general and not only takeover-driven perspective, Gilson &
Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors,
originally presented at the Salomon/Rutgers Conference, supra note 7, now in 43 STAN. L.
REv. 863 (1991). On the possibly temporary nature of the takeover lull, see They Will
Return, ECONobsST, Feb. 9, 1991, at 19.
10 This approach also recognizes that in most of Continental Europe the takeover
phenomenon not only is less visible in practice, but cannot rely on the theoretical justification prevalent in the United States (the "market for control") to nearly the same extent. See, e.g., von Thadden, On the Efficiency of the Market for Corporate Control,43
KYKLos 635 (1990).
1 According to data derivable from the survey in 18 PENsIoNs & INVESTM-NMS, Jan.
22, 1990, at 14, the international (non-U.S.) equities dedicated to defined benefit plans
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discussion focuses on these aspects of the institutional investment phenomenon. It is based on the outward-bound movement
of American investment funds to foreign markets, and thus towards foreign firms, though some of its conclusions and proposals should bear with equal validity on foreign institutional investment in American markets and firms. It also looks at the
channels of financial intermediation and their relation to this
new form of savings and investment in comparative perspective.
I begin with a brief and unavoidably factual sketch of the
reasons for and consequences of the different growth patterns of
these investment pools in the United States and abroad. There
follows a brief review of the related issue of the salient differences between the "receiving institutions" of the United States
and of those abroad that intermediate and receive this flow of
funds-the organized securities markets and the ultimate capital-seeking firms. That factual setting permits a comparative
discussion of the legal and political issues raised by the growing
globalization of institutional investment. In particular, it permits a discussion of the relation of financial intermediation-its
agents, structures, and processes-to the corporate governance
role of the new class of institutional investors.
The principal foreign setting chosen for this discussion is
Germany. Its firms and intermediate financial institutions, as
well as its laws, display important differences from their United
States counterparts. On the other hand, its setting within a liberalizing European Community and its exposure, in substantial
part via London, to mobile investment-seeking capital stemming
from other European and other (including American) foreign
savers invites reflections on possible changes in these institutions and laws over time. 12 It is this intermediary role of
London, rather than an expectation that United Kingdom laws
and institutions provide a basis for a tertium comparationis,
that leads me to include some comments on the United Kingdom setting in this discussion. 13 Nevertheless, the unique British
held by the top 200 American pension funds at the end of 1989 had a market value of
almost $27 billion.
12 See Buxbaum, supra note 8, for a more detailed demonstration of these brief
assertions.
1" For a discussion of the importance of pension funds and related institutional investors among owners of British firms, see R. MINNS, supra note 4, at 22 (1975 figures
indicate that insurance firms and pension funds together hold almost one-third of the
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history of a century-long, union-led, political battle for pensions,
and the difficult fit of those pension funds' investment (and potential governance) activities within the City's financial world, in
their own right yield insights into the still relatively open American and relatively closed German worlds of financial
intermediaries.
The comparative focus of this study, thus, yields several
conclusions:
(1) The dynamics of the phenomenon of institutional ownership-its reasons for developing, its future growth and
proliferation problems, its potential limitations-still are not
fully understood. Even a straightforward comparison of the past,
present, and potential scope and characteristics of institutional
savings growth and ownership patterns in otherwise similar
economies can help make the individual national setting more
comprehensible.
(2) The liberalization of capital movements and the transnational mobility of portfolio investment make the possible
asymmetry of investment flows an important subject for investigation, given the impact of this capital mobility on the intermediation structures and processes of previously national financial
markets.
(3) On the assumption that the rise in institutional investment disturbs preexisting factual and legal patterns of ownermanager relations within private firms, a comparative study of
the different structural and functional aspects of these relations
in otherwise similar economies can help in the formulation and
analysis of policy proposals that aim to establish new ownermanager relations better suited than old ones to these new
realities.
(4) Of specific importance are the structure, behavior, and
performance of traditional financial intermediaries as these bear
on the governance of firms. These attributes, indeed the actors
themselves, likely will have to adapt to new forms of efficient
intermediation made possible by the new institutional investors.
It is therefore doubly important to understand these previous

equity shares of UK firms). NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PENSION FUNDS. LTD, Six rmr
ANNUAL SURVEY OF OCCUPATIONAL PENSION ScHMEs 1990, 53 (1991) indicates that these

funds held approximately $170 billion of UK and overseas equities as of 1990, 517
thereof in UK firms.
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patterns and to evaluate their adaptability to the new institutions, which are in a position to recombine in one agent the previously separated roles of saver, intermediary, and owner.
(5) Finally, an initial comparative analysis of the underlying
social, political, economic, and even cultural constraints on potential structural changes in the ownership and control of private firms in the modern liberal economy is independently useful. It may help remind us of the enduring validity of social
theory in an era in which the discrediting of a major wing
thereof-Marxist theory-leaves important social issues, in the
West as well as in the East, unilluminated by self-reflection.
This is a particularly important defect in a world that urgently
needs to accommodate both ecological imperatives and economic
orders, orders that neither in their socialist nor in their capitalist variants have yet learned to build those imperatives into
their productive sectors' purposes and decision-making
processes.
This is a large and ambitious program, and in this first look
at the sketched situation little more than an agenda for ongoing
inquiry can be achieved. I intend first to describe, and explain
the reasons for, the growth of these institutional investment
funds in their different national settings. I then describe their
investment behavior, including their voluntary or regulated role
as participants in the governance of the firms in their investment portfolios. From this follows a comparative review of the
responses by the private firm sector as well as by government to
this new phenomenon and its discontents. Particularly important here is the implication of these thrusts and counterthrusts
at the transnational level.
On this basis, it is then possible to look at the structure and
behavior of the financial intermediaries as these developed in
their specific national historical setting, highlighting here the
German Hausbanken and Grossbanken. The governance relationship between them and their portfolio firms is a particularly
important issue, since it is one of the most appealing models
suggested for the developing American relationship between
pension funds and private firms. The analogous use of this
model for the relation of institutional investors with firms in a
"privatized" universe-as predicted or prescribed by some observers of the American scene-is discussed and rejected. A different aspect of that relationship, however, namely its role in le-
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gitimating both the firms and the funds in their respective
societal tasks, is more positively evaluated.
I.

Tm GROWTH OF INSTITUTIONAL

INVESTMENT FUNDS IN COM-

PARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

A.

14
The Engines of Growth

Institutional investment vehicles generally are grouped in
five categories: foundations and endowments, bank (non-pension) trusts, insurance companies, investment companies, and
private and public pension funds.15 Motives for the investment
of private households' surplus savings in corporate securities are
not so cleanly categorizable, but making provision for retirement
income is a large one. In the prevalent American as well as European terminology, retirement funding is based on three "pillars":
a first pillar of social security or analogous income; a second pillar of employment-based, usually collectively bargained or
granted "private pension" income; and a third pillar of privately
and voluntarily initiated, individually purchased, retirement income. More succinctly, "[a]s originally conceived, Social Security
was to be one of three sources of retirement income, the others
being private pensions and savings."16
The first pillar is itself supported by government fiscal revenues and, despite the recent move towards the creation of social
security reserves to safeguard payments for the coming several
decades, still is predominantly a current account system. The
second pillar, at least in the United States and United King" For a general and widely comparative brief survey of many of the following issues
of demographics, taxation, and fund structures, see Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Reforming Public Pensions (Social Policy Studies No. 5)
(1988).
11Institutional Investor Project, Columbia University School of Law, The Growth of
Institutional Investors in U.S. Capital Markets 6 (1988). The adequacy of the classification is questioned in Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MIcH. L R . 520,
567 (1990).
'" Hurd, Research on the Elderly: Economic Status, Retirement, and Consumption
and Saving, 28 J. EcoN. Lrr. 565, 590 (1990).
'" See
. AARON,B. BosworTH & G. BwRrass, CAN AurmcA Amro=a T'o GRow OLD?
(1989). For the present, see simply the primary documentation, Social Security Trust
Funds: 1970 To 1988, Table No. 587, in STATSTcAL AmAcr OF THe UNTED STATES
1990 (110th ed., 1989). On the related issue of the "last generation" and its inability to
benefit from the bargain, see the microeconomic explanation of its limited relevance in
I-LVERBON, THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC PENSION SCHUMS (1988).
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dom,1 8 is supported by the dedication of periodic premium payments to a trust fund that is in turn invested and in this augmented form is actuarially expected to yield the promised or
required benefits. The third pillar, private assets, may in turn be
occasionally or periodically transferred to a private version of
such a trust fund, or may be more traditionally invested in the
straightforward expectation that at the end of the day it will
yield the desired retirement income. The five mentioned forms
of institutional investment can be correlated, in roughly descending order of importance, to these three pillars of retirement
income. 9 A first comparatively critical question, therefore, concerns the proportion of total institutional investment found in
these categories, and the trends in their absolute and relative
growth rates.
In the United States the percentage of retirement income
derived by all households from the second pillar, pensions, has
remained fairly steady over the past decades, at roughly 15 percent of total income. 20 The percentage of income derived from
the third source of support, private assets, however, has substantially increased over that time from 15 percent to over 25
percent.2" Thus the average household received approximately
40 percent of its retirement income from surplus savings that
were either voluntarily or involuntarily invested, on the basis
of voluntary or involuntary and periodic or irregular contributions, but overwhelmingly through intermediary institutional
investors.
The percentage distribution of retirement-age households
receiving various proportions of their total retirement income
from these two sources reflects these aggregate data. Thus, while
the percentage of households receiving over 50 percent of their
total retirement income from pensions has barely increased in
twenty years from 6 percent to 7 percent, the percentage of similar households receiving over 50 percent of their income from
the mentioned privately held assets increased from 7 percent to
" For a description of the British version of first and second pillar integration, see
E. SHRAGGE, PENSIONS POLICY IN BRITAIN: A SOCIALIST ANALYSIs 146 (1984).
1" See Hurd, supra note 16.
20 Id. See also G.FIELDS & 0. MITCHELL, RETIREMENT, PENSIONS, AND SOCIAL SECUR-

try 13 (1984).
" See Hurd, supra note 16.
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12 percent.2 2 In short, almost one-fifth of American retirees live
substantially off individually and collectively generated savings.
It also is important to note the specific increase in the role
of government pensions (other than Social Security), because
these pensions are funded and administered in ways directly relevant to our concern with the policy implications of institutional
investment in and potential control of private firms.2 3 The percentage of elderly households receiving more than 50 percent of
their income from this source-essentially, state and local government employees-rose from 3 percent to 5 percent between
1971 and 1986. Perhaps more significantly, the percentage receiving some of their income (between I percent and 49 percent)
from that source more than doubled from 3 percent to 8 percent. 24 One reason for the importance of this latter segment is
the increasing incidence of so-called "integrated" retirement
benefit plans, which both in the federal and state public employment sector base the second-pillar retirement benefit on the
shortfall between Social Security benefits and some agreed-upon
minimum pension benefit.2 5 Since the Social Security component of that overall pension level, while growing, has steadily become a smaller proportion of the total package,2" the federal
public employment sector now has joined the state public employment sector to become a substantial player in the funding of
the second pillar and in the investment of those funds in the
corporate economy.
In this funding method lies one of the principal comparative
points of reference for our topic, for it differs substantially from
= Id.

By 1987, approximately 7,300,000 elderly were receiving state or federal pension
benefits. See Bixby, Benefits and Beneficiaries Under PublicEmployee Retirement Systems, Fiscal Year 1987, 53 SOc. SEC. BULL, June 1990, at 23.
2"

24

Id.

While federal employees were under their own system for decades (the Civil Service Retirement System), since 1986, with the establishment of the Federal Employees
Retirement System, even the federal government has moved to this integrated benefit
system. See Bixby, supra note 23.
The British battle over this issue of integration, with its more ideological and classconflict overlay, is well reviewed in L HANNAH, INVENTING REnnm%,m. TiE DEaELOPAENT OF OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS IN BArrIN

(1986).

"' Average annual benefits under the federal scheme were approximately $13,500 by
1987; state benefits, because of the longer history of Social Security integration, were
approximately $7,500. See Bixby, supra note 23, at 25 (Table 3). Neither figure includes
the Social Security component. See note 27 infra.
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the funding method in Germany; I return to this immediately
below. Remaining for a moment, however, with this look at the
proportional roles of the pillars of retirement income, there is a
second comparative point of reference in the relative importance
of the first as against the second source of retirement income.
In the United States, the role of private pension funds has
grown in importance because of the relatively less generous
levels of retirement benefits paid under Social Security, the first
pillar. For the working poor, be they poor during their working
lives or during retirement, the low level of Social Security benefits (currently only $975 per person per month and 150 percent
thereof per couple at the practically unobtainable maximum)

28

is

a fact of life. For the middle class it is an incentive both to save
and, more to the point, to put pressure on employers to fund
supplemental pension benefits. This pressure is expressed in the
high growth rate of private (and, indirectly, even of public) sector pension plan funding.2" Indeed, at one time it led to the consideration of plans to make private, supplemental pensions
mandatory.30 Great Britain also falls within this category,
though for somewhat different reasons.31 In Germany, on the
other hand, with state pension payments at a level much closer
to average lifetime annual income, 2 there is correspondingly less
pressure on employers to make the funding of the second pillar a
major priority.3 3 This expresses itself in a demonstrably lower

" For a wide-ranging comparison of these eligibility and payment figures, see OECD
Survey, supra note 14, at 114.

28 20 C.F.R. § 440 (1990). See the workout tables at I Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 168,

1056.
' Bodie, Pensions as Retirement Income Insurance, 28 J. EcoN. LIT. 28 (1990), cites

a governmental study indicating that 42 million American employees were covered by
some sort of pension plan as of 1987. There is, however, a distinct break between the
relative prevalence of employee pension plans of the large employer and the small one.
See E. ANDREWS, THE CHANGING PROFILE OF PENSIONS IN AMERICA (1985) (82% of the

employees of firms employing more than 500 persons were covered by a pension plan in
1983, against only 23% in the case of firms employing less than 100). See also the correlation with unionization reviewed in Bodie, supra, at 36.
so See M. HORLICK & A. SKOLNIK, MANDATING PRIVATE PENSIONS: A STUDY OF EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE (1978) (a study commissioned by the Social Security Administration).
31 See L. HANNAH, supra note 25.
32

The retirement income fluctuates around 65% of the average preretirement earn-

ings. See The Finances of the Statutory Pension Insurance Funds Between 1978 and
1981, 34 DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK MONTHLY REPORTS, Apr. 1982, at 14.
33 See Guthardt, Pensionskassen und B6rse, Federation of German Stock Ex-

changes, Symposium-Pensionskassen und Brse (June 7, 1989).
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current level and lower growth rate for that sector."'
The major point of comparative reference, however, lies in
the way the pension obligations of both private and public sector
employers are funded3 5 and invested.36 In the United States private employment sector, ERISA dictates what tax considerations also stimulate: 37 the current funding, through transfer payments from current revenues to a separate trust fund, of
periodic payments sufficient, with their expected investment
profit, to meet the defined benefit obligations typical of that sec-

tor. 38 In Great Britain, too, union and Labor Party strategy has

See Company Pension Schemes in the Federal Republic of Germany, 36
Aug. 1984, at 30. In the case of the third
pillar, private assets, the higher savings rate for German households, in comparison with
American ones, of course militates against this differential. The overall difference, however, is not large enough to require a major qualification of the text statement. See Saving Through Investment Companies on the Ascent, 40 DEuTSCHE BUNDESBANK MONHLY
REPORTS, Oct. 1988, at 30; Developments in Saving Through Investment Companies
Since 1970, 31 DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK MO~NTHLY REPOnrS, Aug. 1979, at 11.
The increasing longevity of both populations, and the increasing tendency towards
earlier retirement than in previous periods, generates other pressures-.especially pressure on the "intergenerational bargain" that today's sacrifices by wage earners on behalf
of current retirees will be matched tomorrow by another generation-but is not a point
of difference between the two countries. For a comparative survey, see REDEINING Tim
34

DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK MONTHLY REPORTS,

PROCESS OF RET=IMENT-AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

(NV. Schnihl ed. 1939).

- For an excellent comparative analysis of both the funding and the anet-and-liability valuation processes within the specific UK-German perspective, see S. PRODANO,
PENSION FUNDS INVESTMENT AND PERFORMNCE 118 (1987).
36 The macroeconomic consequences of funded versus unfunded pension obligations
is a major issue in itself, based on a "golden rule of accumulation" that examines the
relationship between the economy's rate of growth and the rate of interest. See Phelps,
The Golden Rule of Accumulation: A Fable for Growthmen, 51 AmL Eco. P v. 628
(1961). For a recent discussion from the European perspective, see S. Homuno, TnEORIu
DER ALTERSSICHERUNG (1988).
11 At least for the larger corporations; the prevalence of pensions among smaller
employers remains a matter of concern. See E. ANDREWS, PENSION POLICY AND S.JL
EmPLOYERs AT WHAT PRICE COVERAGE? (1989). See also note 29 and accompanying text
supra.
I That this blithe statement skates over enormously complex questions of actuarial
assumptions, funding practices, and multiple agent-principal monitoring issues among
managers, employee-beneficiaries, shareholders, and creditors is self-evident. For a succinct introduction to most of these questions, see Bulow & Scholes, Who Owns the Assets in a Defined-Benefit Pension Plan? in FIMANCIL ASPECTS OF THE UNITED STATS
PENSION SysT'i 17 (Z. Bodie & J. Shoven eds. 1983); Friedman, Pension Funding,Pension Asset Allocation, and Corporate Finance: Evidence from Individual Company
Data in FINANCIAL

ASPECTS OF THE UNrrED STATES PENSION SYsTE.

107, supra.

Whether a formally funded plan is appropriately funded depends on appropriate
projections of liabilities at appropriate ratios (of projected to vested accrued liabilities)
as well as the selected discount rates to present values. It is, therefore, difficult to make
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consistently given the funding of pensions priority.3 9 In Ger-

many, on the other hand, tax law is only partly relevant and
labor (and labor law) largely indifferent to this decision, with the
result that the private firm's pension obligation to its employees
is either totally off balance sheet or at most (since some recent
legislative changes) treated as an unsecured obligation.40 The
practical result is that the "premium" represented by the annual
on-the-book obligation is reinvested in the enterprise itself, not
in financial assets issued by other firms in the economy. 41 The
voluntary single-employer ESOP-the Employee Stock Option
Plan-is the closest American analogy, 42 though it at least
makes the benefit holder a current shareholder with an immediate residual claim against the employer-enterprise. 43

global statements about the projected "safety" of any, even a funded, plan. See generally
L. KOTLIKOFF & D. SMITH, PENSIONS IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 13 (1983). The Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) periodically releases lists of firms which by its
measure have inadequately funded their pension plans (in the sense of assets available to
pay out all claims if they were to close)-that is, the measure of insurer liability of the
PBGC itself. See, most recently, Shortfall in Pension Funds Cited, N.Y. Times, May 9,
1990, at D4, col. 4.
" See L. HANNAH, supra note 25; R.L. DEATON, supra note 4, at 307.
40 See generally Gesetz zur Verbesserung der betrieblichen Altersversorgung of 1974
[GVbetrAV], BUNDESGESETZBLATT, TEIL I [BGBLI] 3610 (1974); R. HOFER & 0. Aar,

GVBETRAV: KoMMENTAR (1982); Company Pension Schemes in the Federal Republic of
Germany, 36 DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK MONTHLY REPORTS, Aug. 1984, at 30.
On the other hand, this unsecured obligation is secured by a more or less mandatory
quasi-governmental reinsurance scheme funded by premia paid by each employer on a
rigid scheme not tied to the safety of the particular firm's commitment. GVbetrAV,
supra, § 10. For an English explanation, see Flirer, Pension Plan Credit and Insolvency
Insurance: The Foreign Experience, in PENSION PLAN TERMINATION INSURANCEi DOES
THE FOREIGN EXPERIENCE HAVE RELEVANCE FOR THE UNITED STATES? 31 (Kenneth Tolo
ed. 1979).

For a discussion of the balance sheet as well as economic consequence of funded
versus unfunded pension obligations, see Ryan, CorporatePension Fund Management:
Measuring the Pension Liability, 25 GA. L. REv. 117 (1990). On the separate but itself
critical role of the U.S. guaranty schemes in encouraging opportunistic manipulation of
pension funds by private firms, see Keating, PensionInsurance, Bankruptcy and Moral

Hazard, 1990 Wls. L. REV. 65; but cf. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. LTV
Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2668 (1990).
"' As the equilibrium between future and current pension claims heaves into sight,

pressures to anticipate this drain by beginning current funding of future claims also increase. It is an intriguing sidelight that in Germany today the main obstacle to this
prefunding effort may be the competition for cash flow-generated funds created by investment needs in the enterprise sector of the former German Democratic Republic. See
Price, Unification Slows Pre-funding, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Oct. 15, 1990, at 1.
42 I.R.C. § 409A (1982).
13 It also provides a direct voting right. See Note, Employee Stock Ownership
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Such funds as are set aside are invested in different fashion
in the two systems. For plans subject to its regulation, ERISA
dictates prudent investment policy, which in turn dictates diversification among claim-issuing firms and among types of financial assets." Critical to our discussion is the fact that in the
United States this concept of prudence, recharacterized in recent years as a diversification imperative, implies a substantial
proportional investment in corporate equities. 41 The figures confirm that point. Private (trusteed rather than insured) pension
funds invest almost 50 percent of their assets in equities, and
public pension funds are not far behind at 33 percent on the way
to a higher equilibrium. Given the British practice of leaving
these funds' investment decisions to the City and its typical
practices, the proportion of equities to total financial assets of
pension funds is even higher, and approaches two-thirds of total
46
investments of those funds.

In Germany, by contrast, where the invested funds are subject to the regulation applicable to insurance companies, the applicable legal concept of prudence still is based on an asset conservation policy. 47 This means that neither private enterprises

nor the private insurance companies typically used by those enterprises to guarantee (insure) pension benefits are permitted to
invest more than 20 percent of their assets in corporate equities.48 Even this figure is rarely reached, and the average figure

Plans, Voting Rights, and Plant Closings, 11 U. MiC. JL REaoam 162 (1977). In practice, according to Conard, supra note 6, at 149, this is typically passed through to the
(employer-nominated) trustee, not on the model of U.S. proxy regulations but on the
Depotstimmrecht model.
4 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 [ERISA], Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 829 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1974) and elsewhere). See generally J.
LANGBEIN & B. WOLK. PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW (1990). Decisions interpreting this imperative are as rare as they are inconclusive. See, e.g., Brock v. Walton, 794
F.2d 58 (11th Cir. 1986).
5 See generally B. LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGUI1 T AND THE PRUDENT WAN RULE (1986).
4" See Helowicz, Pension Fund Investment, in B. BENjAuN. S. HAEImA. G.
Hm owicz, G. KAYE & D. W.KIE, PE1SIoNS 83, 86 (1987).
47 Section 54(a), Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz [VAG] BGBLI 2595 (1986). See generally ER PROLSS, R. SCHMIDT & P. FRY. VERSICHERUNGSAUE.ICHT q(,
-Ko mmE.AR
§ 54(a) (10th ed. 1989).
48 The critical role of this issue to the health of the "three-pillar" structure of oldage support is evident, since the "pay-as-you-go" first pillar and a stable, capitalizationbased second pillar buttress the stability of the system. See Heubeck, Das Mischungsverhaltuis Zwischen Umlage-und Kapitaldeckungsverfahren, 78 Z cs"mn VER-
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for analogous equity investment in Germany is roughly 10 percent of total investment, 49 though recently the Office of Insurance Supervision has authorized somewhat more liberal equity
investment practices that may in time raise this figure. 0 The
consequence is that American and even British funds are a far
larger and far more rapidly growing source of investment than
are comparable German funds. Because of the global reach of
these funds,5 1 this source of investment easily could match that
of domestic sources. At present the only constraint on this result
is the narrowness of organized securities markets in any particular country that is the destination of these investment flows.62

SICHERUNGSWISSENSCHAFT

679 (1989).

Capital Formation and Investment Policy of Insurance EnterprisesSince 1975,
32 DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK MONTHLY REPORTS, Apr. 1980, at 11, 15. See also the more
recent statistics to the same effect in Liquid Funds and Investments of InsuranceEnterprises, 42 DEIrSCHE BUNDESBANK MONTHLY REPORTS, Aug. 1990 (Part VI-Capital
Market) (Table No. 7). The low domestic institutional (especially insurance) investment
in domestic equities has been often noted and bemoaned. For a recent recapitulation, see
Claussen, 25 Jahre Deutsches Aktiengesetz von 1965 (II), 36 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
10 (1991).
60 See Bering, Erweiterte Anlagevorschriften far versicherungsunternehmenMiglichkeiten und immanente Anwendungsgrenzen, 5 BETRIEBLICHE ALTERSVER41

SORGUNG

144 (1987).

At the end of 1988, these "Pensionskassen" held only DM 76 billion in assets, of
which only 2% was invested in corporate equities. See Bundesaufsichtsamt for Versicherungswesen, Geschiftsbericht 1988, at 88.
51 It may suffice to point out that the 1989 market value of the international (nonUnited States) equity portfolio of CaIPERS, the California Public Employee Retirement
System, was over $430 million dollars. 1989 was the first year of substantial international
transactions ($493 million purchased, $37 million sold), and the first in which the international portfolio was even separately broken out. See CaIPERS, Annual Investment
Report (1989).
52 Thus, to take one leading example, the market value of the German equities holdings of CaPERS (see note 51 supra) alone, at the end of 1989, was over $23 million.
Relatively speaking, this was a low investment, probably reflecting less a judgment on
German firms than the inadequate investment opportunities on the German stock markets. The Australian equity holdings of CalPERS, to take an extreme case (small economy, active public stock market) were $14 million; its UK holdings, $60 million; its Hong
Kong holdings, $15 million; its Japanese holdings, $224 million! Id. Perhaps, Taiwan is
next. See WuDunn, Taiwan Beckons Foreign Investors, but Its Stock Market Slips,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1990, at D10, col. 1. ("[W]ith stock prices depressed, securities officials say, now is an ideal time to raise the standards of the market and give it an international base by bringing in foreign institutional investors ....
The Government[ ] . . . is
about to review a proposal to allow foreign institutions ... to invest an aggregate of $2.5
billion in securities markets here.") In other words, the foreign institutional investment
typically is still in the market as a wildly varying surrogate for the economy. With improved and deeper securities markets, a probability in post-1992 Europe, that situation
will change.

1991]

INSTITUTIONAL OWNERS AND CORPORATE MANAGERS

15

Finally, one should not overlook the possibility of "onshore" investment by American institutions in the equity securities of foreign issuers made possible by the recent promulgation
of Rule 144A which permits qualified institutional investors to
engage in secondary trading of foreign securities under certain
qualifying conditions.5 The "control-retention" requirements of
ERISA had not seriously constrained the placement of pension
investments abroad," and this new relaxation may provide yet
more impetus to investment in foreign securities. First reports
on its use by foreign issuers suggest a strong focus on pension
funds as the targets of initial placements of these securities."5 As
a result, this may become a major additional component of
American institutional ownership of foreign firms. This form of
investment undoubtedly will become a factor in the debate over
the Jensen privatization thesis.06 This thesis suggests that effiAggregate United States holdings of foreign stocks-overwhelmingly institutional
holdings-are of course correspondingly large. See the data recounted in note 51 supra.
In 1989 alone net U.S. purchases of foreign stocks were roughly $17.6 billion, though this
was perhaps an unusual year because of the decline in the dollar and the sharp surge in
several foreign stock markets. See Bach, U.S. InternationalTransactions,Fourth Quarter and Year 1989, 70 SURV. CuRmRNT Bus. 33, 44 (Mar. 1990).
'3 Exchange Act Release No. 33-6862, 55 Fed. Reg. 17933 (Apr. 30, 1990). See generally Karol, The Effects of Rule 144A, 23 Rv.Ssc. & Cosl REG. 125 (1990).
" Section 1104(b) of ERISA prohibits a covered fiduciary from maintaining the "indicia of ownership" of plan assets outside the jurisdiction of the federal courts, except as
authorized by the Secretary of Labor. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(b) (1974). A 1976 regulation, 29
C.F.R. § 2550.404b-1 (1977), permits foreign securities to be held overseas if controlled
by a qualified financial institution. Although private sector plans are covered by this
provision, public sector plans are not; neither, in any event, is constrained in its basic
investment choices by this requirement. It does, however, encourage a tendency to leave
the voting power over the stock, which itself is a plan asset, with these financial intermediaries, a consequence conflicting with the increasing concern of the Department of
Labor-see note 55 and accompanying text infra-thatthis voting right be more rigorously monitored, free of potential conflicts of interests, and exercised for the exclusive
benefit of the plan beneficiaries.
See Holie, Foreign Deals Draw Investors' Interest, PENsioNs & ImT?4ENrS,
June 25, 1990, at 3. There are, however, some unresolved issues about the eligibility of
pension funds, specifically to invest in certain important categories of these foreign
shares, issues too technical for this discussion. See Silverman & Braverman, Regulation
S and Other New Measures Affecting the InternationalCapitalMarkets, 23 Ray. SEc &
Co.sL REG. 179, 186 (1990).
Jensen, The Eclipse of the Public Corporation, 67 HAv. Bus. Rm Sep.-Oct.
1989, at 61. For a succinct exploration of this relationship between privatization of the
firm and private placement of financial assets with institutional investors, see Longstreth, Takeovers, Corporate Governance, and Stock Ownership: Some Disquieting
Trends, 16 J. PoRTFoLIo MGMT., Spring 1990, at 54.
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ciency considerations related to the disaggregation of conglomerate firms and compensation of managers, to the transaction costs
of remaining a public (listed) company, and to the possibility
that institutional investments now are large enough to satisfy
the capitalization needs of firms, combine to suggest that American firms will in the future "go private" on the LBO model. On
balance, I consider this unlikely, for reasons further considered
below. In any event, while Rule 144A placements are private
placements, the restrictions on their use, restrictions necessary
from the perspective of investor protection, indirectly keep the
issuer in a public capital market.
B.

The Ownership Position of Institutional Investors

The Institutional Investor Fact Book of 1991 of the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) estimates that over 43 percent of
all U.S. corporate equities were owned by institutional investors
in 1989. 57 Brancato, extrapolating from partial data, raises that
estimate to 45 percent for those equities on national exchanges28
It is by now commonly agreed that the proportion of institutional holdings of the equities of the largest United States firms
is even higher-well over 50 percent for the top one hundred
firms; and that, probably because of index and portfolio distribution strategies, the 45 percent figure holds even for the bottom quartile of the top thousand firms, a number almost
59
equivalent to the bottom third of NYSE listings.
Newer data sets are generating other socially important
measures and information. Thus, Brancato reports substantial

11 NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR FACT BOOK 1991 5 (Chart
2) (using the Federal Reserve Board's Flow of Funds data of Sept. 1990 and including in
that proportion 6.7% held by foreign investors, not all of which, of course, are institutional investors; without that component, therefore, the figure would be 37%)(hereinafter FACT BOOK]. See also Black, supra note 15, at 570.
88 Institutional Investors and Corporate America: Conflicts and Resolutions,:
Hearing on The Impact of InstitutionalInvestors on Corporate Governance, Takeovers,
and the Capital Market, Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 15 n.11 (Brancato Report

Oct. 3, 1990) [hereinafter Brancato Report]. See also Brancato, The Pivotal Role of Institutional Investors in Capital Markets 20, presented at the Salomon/Rutgers Conference,

supra note 7.
88 Brancato Report, supra note 58, at 22. The FACT BOOK reports that all US capital
market equities were valued at $3.8 trillion in 1989. FACT BOOK, supra note 57, at 2
(Chart 1).
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concentration of overall investments within the largest institutional investors.60 Since the largest investors are pension funds,
especially (because of the size of the "work unit") public pension
funds, the nature, structure, function, and processes of these
pension funds have become an additional public issue of considerable importance.
In the United States, using 1988 data, three-fourths of the
mentioned percentage of equity value held institutionally was
held by institutions that can fairly be correlated with pensionrelated savings: the pension funds, the investment companies
(mutual funds), and the life insurance sector of the insurance
companies. Given the high absolute value of total institutional
assets, over $5 trillion in 1988 and approximately $5.7 trillion by
the end of 1989,61 this suggests that approximately $4.5 trillion
in total assets are held by institutions supporting the second and
third pillars.6 2 Of these institutions, private and public sector
pension funds alone were estimated to hold $2.4 trillion in total
assets, of which almost $1 trillion was in the form of United
States corporate equities, representing over 25 percent of the
market value of this category of financial assets. And within this
pension fund cohort, the public (state and local government)
pension funds alone represent 30 percent.6 3 Using the 1986 figure of 35 percent as the proportion of total institutional assets
" Brancato Report, supra note 58, at 23.
The same report also demonstrates the concentration of the management of these
funds among the largest money-manager intermediaries. The top 20 accounted for over
43% of the top 200 funds, and overall controlled over 25% of all institutional investments ($620 billion of $2.4 trillion) by 1989. Id. It is this concentration among intermediaries, rather than among the funds themselves, that lends weight to the Jensen
privatization thesis. See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
61 FACT BooK, supra note 57, at 3 (Table 2) (including, however, over $1.5 trillion of
foreign-sector investment). This figure represents approximately 43% of all financial assets available through US capital markets, id. at 2 (Chart 1), and over 18% of all US
financial assets, id. at 4 (Table 3).
2 The British figures are roughly comparable, which is not surprising given the similar structure and investment attributes--$120 billion by 1984, growing at more than
10% annually. See L. HANNAH, supra note 25, at 139. See also Helowicz, supra note 46,
at 85.
"State and local government pension plans cover a larger proportion of their sectors' employees than is the case in the private employment sector. Already a decade ago,
the approximately 150 state plans, 300 large-city plans, and thousands of small plans
together covered close to 12 million persons, while all private employer plans covered
only approximately 30 million people. See L. KoTnnoFF & D. S~ruH, supra note 38, at
171, 352.
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invested in United States corporate equities, it would follow that
these public pension funds' equity holdings comprise over 7.5
percent of the market value of all listed and publicly traded
stocks.6 4
The growth rate of the entire pension-related institutional
investment sector, especially for the private and public sector
pension fund group, is as remarkable as these current aggregate
figures.6 5
C.

The National Capacity to Absorb Investment Flows

The other side of the coin of this nationally differentiated
flow of investments is the nationally differentiated absorptive
capacity of the various stock markets, which in turn is a function of firm listings and of the depth of the public float of those
listed stocks. Here the contrast between the United States and
Germany is especially striking. Using the criteria of public ownership of securities and sufficient float to make their market
value a reflection not only of day-to-day clearing prices but also
of "intrinsic" value (that is, of the control premium), approximately eight thousand American firms are available candidates
for institutional investments over public share exchanges as
against, at the most, approximately eighty German firms.60
The German private firm sector is more than one one-hundredth the size of the American one, of course, but even if private placement of equity securities were available as an investment alternative for foreign institutional investors, the U.S.German firm ratio at best would be approximately 10:1, still well
below the relative proportions of the private sectors of the two
economies.6 7 The reasons for this disparity lie in history and are
briefly sketched later; for the present it is enough to take this as
FAcT BooK, supra note 57, at 3, Table 2.
e" Id. at 19 and Table 3. It is an artfcle of faith among observers (especially partici:4

pant-observers!) that particularly the premium-driven pension funds exist to buy, not to
sell, financial assets. See, e.g., Henriques, After Eight Years, the Bear is Back, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 28, 1990, at D1, col. 3 ("Most of the investment community is structured to
buy stocks, not to sell them. .. . That's why pension funds exist and mutual funds exist
and bank trust departments exist-to buy stocks."). Nor is this exclusively an American
phenomenon. Price, Australian Market Hobbled by Pension Funds, 18 PENSIONS & IN-

1, 1990, at 3 ("Declining contributions to Australian defined benefit
funds means fewer dollars available to invest in stocks.").
e See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 8, at 318.
6 The story told in note 52, supra, amply confirms this observation.
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a fact of life and to consider its consequences.
Using foreign rather than institutional investment as our
measure, and fully recognizing the United States policy in favor
of foreign, trade deficit-reducing, stock market investment as a
major factor in increasing the foreign share, it still is striking
that foreign investment currently accounts for roughly 10 percent of New York Stock Exchange market values,03 and only 10
percent of London's, but 45 percent of Frankfurt's.08 With a
maximum of some six hundred listings on that exchange, over
five hundred of which represent so small a percentage of their
firms' stock issuance as to make investment in them an institutionally infeasible gamble,70 there simply is no real absorptive
capacity on such a mini-exchange."
The consequences are twofold. For most stock corporations,
the brute fact that bank and cross-corporate holdings render
them inaccessible to a hostile change of control, and make ordinary bloc purchases less likely, ends the matter for the time being.71 For the larger segment of German business cast in the
form of a Gesellschaft mit beschriankter Haftung, or membership corporation, the nontransferable and illiquid nature of their
ownership interests accomplishes the same thing.7 3 For that
small number of firms genuinely accessible, on the other hand,

Board of Governors, United States InternationalTransactions in 19S9, 76 Fed.
Res. Bull. 267, 277 (May 1990); See also Board of Governors, InternationalStatistics,76
Fed. Res. Bull. A 67 (Table 3.4) (Sept. 1990).
11 Report presented at Symposium, Pensionskassen und Birse, Federation of the
German Stock Exchanges, Frankfurt (June 7, 1989). According to a survey of the situation at the end of 1989, foreign investors represented over 50% of all exchange transactions in domestic equity shares and over 30% of their value (including investment certificates). AG-Report, 35 DiE AKTMNGESELLSCHAFr R 382 (1990).
70 This is a gamble, at least, from the traditional United States investment perspective, because the small public float means that these shares enjoy little of the "play" that
the control-market component of the American stock market brings to national exchanges. Changes of control, and premium payments associated therewith, are less likely
to target the minority of publicly held shares.
71 See also Kallfass, The American Corporationand the InstitutionalInvestor: Are
There Lessons From Abroad? - The German Experience, 1988 COLUM. Bus L Rxv. 775.
72 Hansen, Das Hachststimmrecht und seine Probleme, 35 AKrTW0OESql SCHAFr R
166 (1990), reports from his own investigations that only 6% of all Frankfurt-listing
firms had more than 50% of their issued stock in public float; only 4% had 75% or more.
Of course, among these were the largest-that is, there is a correlation between size of
firm and wide distribution of ownership.
73 See F. KOBLER & R. SCHMIDT, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT UND KoN.w%,.TATion
71
(1988).
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the literal "alienation" of their ownership is a probability over
time unless blocked by even stronger defensive measures than
those we have become used to in our takeover battles, measures,
such as maximum-vote limitations, which the vulnerable Ger74
man (and many other European) firms are busily implanting.
From a stock market and, even more important, from a
public policy perspective, this disequilibrium embarrasses efforts
to make the transition from the historically based German universal Grossbank dominance of corporate governance as well as
of corporate ownership to the more open system envisaged and
necessitated by "Europe 1992," a system most commentators believe also is inevitable.7 5 Most of this transition embarrassment,
of course, relates to the fear of hostile, especially foreign, takeovers. The tortuous path of the European Community's "Takeover Directive" from its official launching in January 1989 to its
current foundering in the waters of hostility reflects these diffi-

14 Hansen, supra note 72, found that, by the end of 1989, 23 of the 628 Frankfurtlisting firms, which, however, represented 28% of the original issue value of the listed
shares, had adopted various restrictions of this category. An even more vivid picture,
that of the lockup of an entire national corporate sector with the blessing of the country's major stock exchange, is provided for The Netherlands in R.P. VOOaD, STATUAIRE
BESCHERMINGSMIDDELEN BIJ BEURSVENNOOTSCHAPPEN (1989). See especially his extensive,
firm-by-firm tabulation of specific defenses. Id. at 449.
For a discussion of these defensive measures under current German law, especially
of this Hbchststimmrecht cap on the exercise of voting power by a single shareholder,
see Baums, Hachststimmrechte,35 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 221 (1990), and Schneider,
Gesetzliches Verbot frir Stimmrechtsbeschrlinkungen bei der Aktiengesellschaft?, 35
DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 56 (1990). Following a commissioned study, the EC Commission is separately considering a ban on this particular defensive measure. See EG-Kommission plant Verbot des HMchststimmrechts, 36 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCIHAFT R 55 (1991),
For a wider-ranging discussion, see W. WERNER, PROBLEME "FEINDLICIIER"
UBERNAHMEANGEBOTE IM AKTIENRECHT (1989); and compare the polemic between the
more control market-based argument of Adams, Was spricht gegen eine unbehinderte
ubertragbarkeitder in Unternehmen gebundenen Ressourcen durch ihre Eigentlimer?,
35 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 243 (1990) and the more corporatist argument of Z611ner &
Noack, One share - one vote?, 36 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 117 (1991).
76 It is in this context that the comparison with the United Kingdom has some significance. The British pension funds were early able to invest in a wider and more liquid
range of financial assets, especially corporate equities, both because of their availability
in the more open UK system and because of the early arrival of competition among
financial intermediaries. See L. HANNAH, supra note 25, at 76. Thus both the funds and
the intermediaries are, within the European Community, a significant engine for modernization or liberalization of this combined firm and intermediation structure.
The UK also offers a historical test of the argument that foreign players in time
influence both the structure and the behavior of preexisting domestic intermediaries.

See, e.g., D. MEERSCHWAM, BREAKING FINANCIAL BOUNDARIES 162 (1991).
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culties,76 as does its vacillating reaction to Member State efforts
to insulate national firms from a European version of the market

for corporate control. But the story has implications beyond the
takeover arena, and beyond the German scene, and these impli-

cations form the basis for much of what follows. Our domestic
experience with the governance role of the institutional investors
may inform the pending European experience even as it may be
reciprocally shaped by Europe. 7
D.

The Relationship of InstitutionalInvestors and Firms

The "alienation" of private sector ownership into foreign
hands has at bottom a financial and economic significance. But
its significance is in the first instance also a straightforward issue of corporate governance. A totally passive portfolio investor,
whose unhappiness is expressed only in the time-honored way of
voting with one's feet, may be easier to accept than an active
one. As United States funds begin to flow into European stock
markets in significant amounts, the American corporate governance situation, and especially the institutional sector's evolution

towards an active role in corporate governance, will begin to
have significance in the European setting.7 8 At the same time,

1 Obstacles to HostileBids are Target of New EC Plans, 2 External Impact of Eur.
Unif. (BNA) 6 (May 18, 1990). On the earlier draft, see Note, The European Community's ProposedDirective on Takeover Bids and Its Impact on Shareholders'Rights, 16
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 561 (1990); see also Baums, Ubernahmeregelnin der Europiischen
Gemeinschaft, 5 ZEITSCHRIFT F.INTERNAT'LES PnivATREcHr 21 (1989).
7 European-wide concern with these issues is reflected in DEFENSIVE MEASUREs
AGAINST HOSTILE TAKEOVERS IN THE COMMON MARKEr (J. Maeijer & K. Geens eds. 1990);
see also IBA Section on Business Law, Report, Constraintson Cross Border Takeovers
and Mergers, 19 INT'L Bus. LAW. 51 (1991).
78 The situation already has spawned a mini-industry of specialized intermediaries
exploring the "barriers" to U.S.-style participation in the corporate governance element
of foreign portfolio holdings and offering both informational and implementing services.
See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (J. Lufkin & D. Gallagher eds. 1990);
INVESTOR REsPONsmIiTY RESEARCH CENTER, SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS ABROAD (1990); Inves-

tor Responsibility Research Center, How to Vote Non-U.S. Proxies, in GLOMU. SHAREHOLDER (1990).
At the same time, the relatively passive traditional attitude of foreign institutional
investors, especially the British superannuation funds is giving way to US.-style assertive behavior. See Buxbaum, supra note 8, at 30; ASSOCIATION OF BRITISH INsUalEs, THE
ROLE AND DUTIEs OF DIRECTORS - A STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICE (1991); ASSOCIATION
OF BRITISH INSURERS, RESPONSIBILITIES OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (1991), as well as the
recent formation of interest groups such as the Institutional Shareholders' Committee
and the Pension Investment Research Consultants. Generally to this shift of UK institu-
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the different factual and legal structures within which European
corporate governance relations are embedded not only dictate a
different pattern of assimilation for this new type of shareholder, but hold their own lessons for the future evolution of
investor-manager relations on the American scene.
The past decade has witnessed the emergence of a conscious
and active institutional investor.79 A major spur to the development of this attitude was the institutional sector's reaction to
the increasingly effective effort of management, with shareholder
approval, to claim for itself the right or, without that express
approval, the power to forestall or defeat hostile takeover efforts. At first, the institutional drive to preserve for investors,
not managers, the ultimate tender or recapitalization decision
was partly blunted by the way in which financial sector intermediaries exercised much of the portfolio voting power for
these institutions, along with the investment decisions themselves. The large, especially public sector institutions, however,
began to draw that power in-house. The private sector institutions were willingly or unwillingly brought to the same conclusion by force of federal guidelines that come close to treating the
portfolio voting power like the discretionary investment power,
namely, as a plan asset.80 This subsumption under a general
duty of prudence had special bite in the area of shareholder participation in decisions to emplace antitakeover devices, but recent Department of Labor suggestions, as well as the practice of
important institutional agents, such as Wells Fargo Investment

tions' behavior, see Taylor, Can Big Owners Make a Big Difference? 68 HARV. Bus. REv.,

Sep.-Oct. 1990, at 70, 78; Sherman, Governance Lessons from Abroad, 15 DIRECTORS &
BOARDS 24 (1991). As to the German scene, and the arrival there of a respectable shareholder interest association, the Deutsche Schutzvereinigung for Wertpapierbesitzer, see
West Germany's New Investor Activism, IRRC GLOBAL SHAREHOLDER, Aug. 1990, at 5.
" In lieu of direct and detailed citations to the following, see the citations in Buxbaum, supra note 8, at 17-25, and the recent overview in Sommer, Corporate Governance in the Nineties: Managers vs. Institutions, 59 U. CN. L. REv. 357 (1990).
"0For a discussion of this development, following on the so-called "Avon Letter" of
the Department of Labor, see Buxbaum, supra note 8, at 25. A rare case actually focusing on the duty to vote as an element of prudence in the ERISA context is Schoenholtz
v. Doniger, 628 F. Supp. 1420 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
While these imperatives still are limited to the domestic field, some pressure to extend them to the voting of shares of foreign issuers is beginning to be felt, and certainly
nothing in the philosophy leading to the subsumption of voting within the general duty
of prudence would exclude the foreign situation. See U.S. Labor Department Favors
Global Proxy Voting, IRRC GLOBAL SHAREHOLDER, Aug. 1990, at 2.
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Advisors,"1 and large mutual fund family sponsors, such as Fidelity Investments,8 2 have taken the issue beyond that specific
set of problems to general shareholder activism. The upshot is
that at least the large and especially the public sector fund today is an increasingly active participant in and initiator of a
wide range of active corporate governance behavior patterns.
This activity has come so far along as to bump up against
some significant constraints created by traditional securities regulation. These constraints may have been originally enacted to
prevent financial manipulation, but now they stand in the way
of new efforts to augment this institutional power. 3
I do not intend to recapitulate the excellent recent analyses
of the technical problems that at least in the United States prevent these new owners from enjoying rights that the formal legal
regime purports to grant to all owners but which are as much a
snare and delusion as they are an entitlement.8 ' Nevertheless, a
brief sketch of these technical problems is a necessary introduction to a broader, more policy-oriented comparative review of
these important efforts to implement the traditional vision of
shareholder primacy in the modern setting.
The dysfunctional impact of an otherwise commendable regime of United States securities regulation on the role of institutional investors has begun to be criticized in the economic and
legal literature, and need not be reviewed in detail here. Immediate reform proposals focus on the proxy system, especially on
its unavailability for a modern, institutional investor-driven
form of director nomination and to a lesser extent on its potential threat to communication between these shareholders. 5 The
81 See Buxbaum, supra note 8, at 19.
82 See Investor Responsibility Research Center, 6 Corn'. Gov. BuL., Nov.-Dec. 1959,
at 153. This particular development of more aggressive postures in hitherto quiescent
segments of the institutional investor sector also is noted by Gilson & Kraakmnn, supra
note 9, at 9 n..
83 Fiduciary rules from sources other than securities regulation (eg., from ERISA or
common-law sources) also may constrain active governance behavior, especially at the
boardroom level, by institutional investors. See Roe, InstitutionalInvestors in the Boardroom, in INSTITrTONAL INVESrOR& CHALLENGES AND RESPONSIBILrr[ES (A. Samsetz & J.
Bickler eds. forthcoming 1991)
" These are particularly well set forth in Conard, supra note 6, and much of what
follows in the text is taken from that source.
9 Black, supranote 15, at 536, details yet other problems for institutional investors
under the current proxy regulation regime.
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major initiative of CalPERS to put reconsideration of these issues on the SEC's agenda,86 and the clear if muted resistance of
the corporate establishment to that reconsideration, are evidence of the importance of this problem. They also demonstrate
the new role of the old legal regime to insulate management's
control of the -director nomination process, and more generally
of the overall process of setting the agenda for shareholder voting, against intrusion by the new ownership.
A second reform effort, proposed by Conard s7 but not yet

finding resonance elsewhere, 8 is directed to the inappropriate
application of the problematic "controlling person" concept of
traditional securities regulation to this new group of institutional investors, if they take collective or consciously parallel actions that trigger the concept and its many civil and administrative consequences. In his view, the underlying original purpose
of creating this vague but potent "controlling person" concept,
namely, to prevent intrusion on corporate decision-making
processes by financial institutions not acting through the board
of directors, is inapplicable to the benign purposes for which institutional investors form coalitions (primarily, to nominate and
elect directors). Whether it is so easy to separate the investment
banker goat from the institutional investor sheep, however, is
not obvious at first glance. The issue has deeper and more ambivalent implications involving the appropriateness of bringing
institutional investors into the kind of private intermediation
network proposed by the Jensen privatization thesis and found
under rather different circumstances in the traditional German
intermediation structure.8 9
A third constraint lies in the antitrust laws. The Hart-ScottRodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 requires the filing
of information about the acquisition of certain percentages of a
firm's shares with the Department of Justice to permit consideration of antitrust issues. This has been reported to be a significant deterrent to concerted if not individual institutional
so

See the widely circulated formal request from CaPERS to the Division of Corpo-

rate Finance, S.E.C. (Nov. 3, 1989), reprinted in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS: PASSIVE FIDUCIARIES TO ACTIVIST OWNERS 454 (1990).
87 See Conard, supra note 6.
88 See especially the critique of Gilson & Kraakman,
88 See text accompanying note 56 supra.

supra note 9, at 56.

1991]

INSTITUTIONAL OWNERS AND CORPORATE MANAGERS

25

purchases.90 An even more significant constraint may be in the
offing, now that aggressive private defensive efforts to take a
firm "out of play" are being buttressed by an increasing number

of statutes that not only support specific defenses (such as control-share acquisition constraints)9 ' but authorize management

to consider the interests of other constituencies in general.2 - In
response, equally aggressive countermoves by some institutional

investors also have developed.93 There is a potential if slight risk
that these can cross the line of antitrust law. For example, this
might be the case with a call for a collective boycott of institutional investment in a firm taking advantage of Pennsylvania's
recent and deservedly notorious antitakeover and antiproxy con-

test statute.9 4 In short, a number of public law regimes, and not
only the law of securities regulation, inadvertently if not legitimately stand in the way of at least some proposed means to the
achievement of a more assertive role for institutional investors

in their capacity as shareholders and voters.05
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1311-1312 (West Supp. 1991). See Conard, supra note 6.
See, e.g., the various classes of "control share" and "business combination" statutes analyzed in Sroufe & Gelband, Business Combination Statutes: A 'Meaningful Op'o

91

portunity' for Success? 45 Bus. LAW. 891 (1990).
912See

the notorious Pennsylvania antitakeover and antiproxy contest statute, 15 PA.
§ 2571 (Purdon Supp. 1991). Another bellwether of this new retrograde

CONS. STAT. ANN.

approach is the 1990 Massachusetts statute reported by Gilson & Kraakman, supra note
9, at 15 n.25. The more generally phrased "stakeholder consideration" statutes are cited
and briefly reviewed by Lipton & Rosenblum, A New System of CorporateGovernance:
The QuinquennialElection of Directors, 58 U. CHL L Rv. 187, 214 (1991), who count 29
such statutes by the date of publication.
A separately fascinating and dubious approach, redolent of German social theory of
the Rathenau era, is a 1989 addition to the Michigan Business Corporation Act, 1989
Mich. Pub. Acts 121, which would allow an appropriately qualified "independent director" to represent "the corporation" rather than shareholders, and carry out that representative function in an institutionalized form reminiscent of an ombudsman. See
thereto Moscow, Lesser & Schulman, Michigan's Independent Director,46 Bus. LAw. 57
(1990).
9 For a recent survey, though at a slightly hyperbolic level, see Fromson, The Big
Owners Roar, FORTUNE, July 30, 1990, at 66. See also Par6,Two Cheers for Pushy Investors, FoRTuNE, July 30, 1990, at 95.
" See note 92 supra. Not in confirmation of the legal evaluation of this behavior,
but in confirmation of its sensitivity, see the remark of Walter Wriston, former CEO of
Citibank, N-A., that when "big pension funds (even public pension funds) get together
and decide on what they think, they run the risk of triggering anti-trust laws," in CEOs
Speak Out On Directors, MGMrr Rv., Oct. 1990, at 15.
05 A good picture of the efforts to institutionalize institutional investors' ability to
pool information and to coordinate action can be gleaned from Hearing on The Impact
of Institutional Investors on Corporate Governance, Takeovers, and the Capital Afar-
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This tension can only be understood and resolved within
the context of the various levels of markets-for firms and for
shares-within which these actors engage and contend.
E. Public and Private Markets in Comparative Perspective
Most of the discussion of institutional investor participation
in corporate governance proceeds from a liberal, market-oriented economic premise. This premise requires the active participation of this new actor in the standard American capital market, a market that allegedly monitors firm performance through
two subparts-its clearing market and its corporate control market. 6 Corporate management's well-documented efforts to escape from the consequences of the latter and its arguable encouragement of a dysfunctional "short-termism,197 while they

have been reasonably successful at state judicial and now even
legislative levels,"8 suffer from an eventually unbrookable contradiction. These firms wish to remain in the public market yet
avoid one of its still inescapable attributes, namely, its corporate
control monitoring.99 Only the privatization of these firms, in
Jensen's terms,100 would be consistent with that wish; but in a
products and services market like that of the United States, that
solution simply is not available for at least the top thousand and
perhaps the top five thousand firms.
Here, too, the experience of Germany in its version of that
privatized structure is instructive and, to some critics of American "short-termism," seductive. Faced with the liberalization of
the European capital markets that is an essential concomitant of
the creation of an "American-sized" single and internal market
ket, Before the Subcom. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 123-212 & passim (Oct. 3, 1989).
9"Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POLIT. ECON. 288
(1980).
17 See, e.g., Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136
U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1987).
" See the statutes cited by Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 92.
" From this perspective, at least, the argument of G. ROTH, DAS TREUHANDMODELL
DES INVESTMENTRECHTS; EINE ALTERNATIVE ZUR AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT? (1972), in favor of
converting the shareholder into a passive trust beneficiary was consistent in formulating
a powerful redemption right for otherwise disenfranchised shareholders. In this way, an
indirect market test and market reference remains to control management behavior and
results.
100See Jensen, supra note 56.
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for goods and services, German policy makers public and private
agree, whether enthusiastically or reluctantly, that the opening
of its financial market structures is unavoidable.1 01 The German
economy's current transition out of its traditional privatized, offmarket firm structure strongly suggests that a privatization
structure for an economy and polity above a certain minimum
siz& is not feasible.
In any event, at least on the American scene and within the

American historical and political context, the Business Roundtable's preferred solution of a joint managerial-financial-institu-

tional corporatism is an unstable one. It would be untempered
even by that indirect mediating/monitoring superstructure available in the tight and disciplined interlock with financial intermediaries still, if decreasingly, found in Germany and Japan
but clearly unavailable in the United States with its large number of competitive financial intermediary institutions.10 2 The
simple mention of the recent collapse of Drexel Burnham Lam-

bert and of much of the savings and loan industry-and perhaps
the relationship between these phenomena 1 3---should suffice to
remind us of this difference.
Even more to the point, this managerial solution would
need a level of ideological legitimation that simply cannot be

10,The unusual public hearing conducted by the Economic Committee of the German Bundestag in May of 1990 on the topic, "The Power of Banks" [Bankenmacht], in
response to the parliamentary questions submitted by the Social Democratic Party and
the Greens, was to a considerable extent motivated by this changing European scene. See
Protokoll No. 74, 11th Wahlperiode, Deutscher Bundestag, Ausschuss fdr Wirtschaft, Az.
742-2401, May 16, 1990, Stenographisches Protokoll [Stenographic Transcript of the
74th Session of the above committee]. Question No. 1 to the assembled experts read:
How do you judge the competition of the banks among themselves, as well as
that between banks and other financial enterprises (e.g., insurance firms) in
the Federal Republic of Germany? How will the EC common market affect the
national and international competitive position of the German banks? What
role will the trend to all-purpose financial institutions play here?
Id. at 5 [Author's translation].
102 This is the principal reason for questioning the import of current institutional
mechanisms by means of which the German and Japanese banking systems provide the
kind of "audit management" that comes closest to the kind of oversight a large bloc
holder which cannot sell its holdings exercises over the firms in the portfolio. See the
eloquent plea for this approach in Drucker, Reckoning with the Pension Fund Revolution, 69 HARv. Bus. Rav., Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 113.
103 See Stevenson, S.& L. Tries Recasting Self as Victim, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19,
1990, at D1, col 6.
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found in its current adversarially formulated presentations. 10 4
The old legitimating ideology-the myth of shareholder
institutional
supremacy-had
to be
abandoned once
shareholdership threatened to make it real;10 5 but giving that
new ownership a pejorative connotation is at best a defensive
tactic, but hardly a legitimating ideology. That can only be
found through cooperation with these new institutions that, after all, represent all of us in our capacity as salary and wage
earners.
In addition-and not in contradiction-the liberal economic
premise on which this managerialist version of corporatism
would function faces a severe test once ecological imperatives
are expected to be operationally satisfied within its framework.
If the ecology, along with the atom bomb, loomed large enough
to render irrelevant the Marxist-Leninist belief in the inevitability of the collapse of capitalism, it behooves us to take seriously
the possibility that it will also put that system under significant
pressure. This, more than concern with the negative consequences of exposing corporate decision-making to the short-term
mentality of stock and control markets, is what dictates a new
respect for a different, longer term vision of corporate behavior. 0 6 And this vision, unlike the adversarial vision of institutional investors as short-term profligates that underlies the narrow view of short-term versus long-term decision-making
immanent in the liberal economy, needs the cooperation
of institutional ownership with corporate management to be realized.
Further, that cooperative venture now has a unique opportunity
to be realized. It can find in the wage-based origin of much of
that institutional ownership a unique and perhaps the only en104See, e.g., THE PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE oF NEW YORK STATETHE $600 BILLION
BURDEN (1988); Lipton, supra note 97.
'05See Buxbaum, Juridification and Legitimation Problems in American Enterprise Law, in JURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES 241 (G. Teubner ed. 1987).
108 This is more than simply a broader version of what already has occurred in the
specific context of "socially sound" investing by institutional shareholders. See B. LONGSTRETH, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONsmILrY AND THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (1973); J. SxMON, C. POWERS & J. GUNNEMAN, THE ETHICAL INVESTOR. UNIVERSITIES AND CORPORATE
REsPoNsmiLrrY (1972). It involves the incorporation or subsumption of previously "external" values within the profit-maximization paradigm. For the macroeconomic version of

this argument, see Passell, Rebel Economists Add Ecological Cost to Price of Progress,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1990, at C1, col. 5 (reviewing the activities and expectations of the
International Society of Ecological Economists).
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during legitimation for embarking on the voyage to integrate
ecological and efficiency concerns in a new statement of corporate missions and processes.
IHL.

A

NEW RELATIONSHIP
PERSPECTIVES

-

AMERICAN

AND

EUROPEAN

This is a plea pitched at a high level of generality. Therefore, a few comments on the validity of the diagnosis and the
operational possibilities of any prescription are appropriate.
A. The Goals of Management and of Institutional Owners
First, the diagnosis. In my opinion, it is not the fear of the
corporate stock and corporate control markets that leads a Fortune 100 company to resist the internalization of the social costs
inherent in an appropriately long-range view of production and
distribution policies that are sound from environmental and social perspectives. It is simply the normal, understandable, and to
a degree societally legitimated drive for profit maximization that
has long been thought to be the essential condition for the production of goods and services at low prices. That, alone, would
not distinguish the American setting from others. This drive,
however, takes place, at least in the United States, within a cultural frame of reference that sees labor and capital as antagonistic competitors, and in a setting untempered by the mediating
institutions found in other liberal economies at both the governmental and the societal (especially the firm) level.
It is not, again, fear of these monitoring markets that turns
all but a very few firms away from seeking ways to join public
sector producers in filling the critical need for social goods ranging from transportation and communication infrastructure, to
shelter and education, to the absorption of an increasingly dysfunctional and racially specific surplus labor population. It is,
simply, the traditional focus on the production of privately
purchasable and priceable goods and services. And we could extend the litany. In short, whatever our individual value judgments about the appropriate role of private sector firms may be,
it should be clear that the "long range" versus "short range" arguments and prescriptions abounding within the traditional liberal economic framework are an inadequate substitute for the
combined ecologic-economic frame of reference that is beginning
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to be perceived as vital for the survival of a liberal economy-as
it would have been for a socialist one.107
Second, the prescriptions. A universe of small shareholders,
whatever their individual value orientations towards these considerations, cannot bring these values to bear on the private sector the way firms and markets presently are organized. Indeed,
to sharpen the paradox, even if they could do so with their voluntary savings, perhaps through ecologically "sound" firms and
mutual funds, they could not do so with the increasingly large
proportion of their wealth that is involuntarily or at least collectively saved and invested. 08 Only large institutional intermediary shareholders can act in this fashion.
To do so, they need two things. First, they need mechanisms to express their values to their portfolio firms more directly than is feasible by means of voting or acting in the capital
and, especially, the control market (though they need those,
too). In the second place, they need mechanisms to formulate
these postulated values within their own boundaries before
transmitting them to those firms, in order to legitimate their
own behavior and decisions.
B. Behavioral Versus Structural Implementation
It is on the first issue that most recent commentary has focused, beginning with current legal rules governing the exercise
of institutional investors' rights, as briefly reviewed above, and
moving on to proposals or critiques of alternative mechanisms
and processes by means of which these voters might influence
corporate management. And within this first issue, most atten107 See Heilbroner, Economics as Ideology, in ECONOMICS AS DISCOURSE 101 (IV.
Samuels ed. 1990); Reflections (After Communism), THE. NEW YORKER, Sept. 10, 1990, at
91, 91, 99; and, from a perspective slightly more critical of the ability of labor and management together to take strong ecologically responsible decisions, see Hoss, Runder
Tisch far die Umwelt, Die Zeit, Nov. 9, 1990, at 13 (Hoss was parliamentary speaker for
the Greens in the Bundestag).
A first step in this direction is the effort of institutional investors to bring environmental issues before shareholders via the shareholder proposal route (e.g., the "Valdez
Principles" issue). See Minow & Deal, Corporations,Shareholders, and the Environmental Agenda, 12 CARDozo L. REV. 1359 (1991); Pink, The Valdez Principles:Is What's
Good for America Good for General Motors?, 8 YALE L. & PoL'Y Rav. 180 (1990).
...This is already clearly recognized in I, HorT, DER KAPITALANLEGERSCHUTZ IM
RECHT DER BANKEN 207 (1975) who following upon this recognition examines earlier efforts to insinuate such shareholder representation into traditional board structures.
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tion has been paid not to the structures within which and the
procedures by means of which these investors' agents would play
out their governance functions, but to the actors themselves,
their attributes and means of selection.
This, I believe, is starting at the wrong end, the personalized end, of the problem. It should be neither surprising nor distressing that the pool from which the new recruits are to be chosen is the same pool from which today's recruits come. If Caesar
and Spartacus mark the extremes of the conceivable range of
governors of that modern version of the state called the largeenterprise sector, and if Samuel and Jeremiah mark the extreme
of the conceivable range of the formers' monitors, then the range
between the background of the CEO and the background of the
new professional independent director recruited from the ranks
of senior partners of large accounting, law, and investment
banking firms appears as little more than a point on the former
spectrum. 109
At this cosmic level, of course, the differences between national business cultures that do exist even among states of similar economic organization tend to disappear, and our exercise
tends to lose specific comparative salience. It therefore is preferable, if anticlimactic, to return to the second-order set of differences existing among those nations, differences expressed in variant forms of savings and investment patterns, of owner and
manager relations, and of general neo-mercantilistic and liberal
accommodation.
Two features are worth examining at that second-order but
for that reason genuinely comparative level: the real structure
and function of enterprise monitoring, and the real structure
and function of intermediation between saver-beneficiaries and
institutional investors. It is my argument that the latter is more
basic than, and determines, the former. I begin, nonetheless,
with the former and, in particular, with a look at the often pos109A salutary lesson as to whether there is adequate personal behavioral differentiation between the two types of representatives may be gleaned from the analogous role of
independent counsel representing the independent directors' litigation committee in the
typical derivative suit. I will not extend this discussion by delving into this experience,
but will rest on the assertion that the results obtained by means of this process do not
suggest that the independent nature and well-paid status of this professional verson of
decision making gives us reason to hope for the sea change expected by Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 9.
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tulated difference between managerial and professional cultures.
Berle and Dodd introduced that dimension of professionality in
their deservedly famous Depression-era debate two generations
ago, 10 and it underlies even the assumptions, not to mention the
solutions, found in the current business, professional, and academic literature briefly presented above.
An appropriate starting point for this part of our inquiry is
the excellent recent critique and proposal of Gilson and Kraakman."" In order to demonstrate the validity of their preferred
solution to the governance problem, namely, the paid professional director hired by and responding to an institutional investor and representing the latter on a number of boards sufficient
to generate an appropriate professional income for this representative, they first consider and dismiss two alternatives." 2 The
first is the shareholders' advisory committee, to which I return
below. The second is a contrasting pair of governance figures
they label the LBO and the German/Japanese governance model
respectively.
According to Gilson and Kraakman, the newly privatized
corporation, hailed by Jensen as the wave of the future, whose
managers and sponsors are effective monitors for their passive
institutional investor-partners because they themselves hold
substantial equity positions, is an inadequate model because it
resolves the governance dilemma "largely by eliminating it
through the wholesale substitution of debt for equity and the
introduction of overwhelming financial incentives. The LBO recipe not only prescribes withdrawal from the public market; it
also requires a massive reassignment of equity to insiders." ' s
This model Gilson and Kraakman contrast with a "radical
alternative," the German/Japanese "bankers model," while noting their underlying similarity: the unification of ownership and
control in the person of a professional intermediary which has a
direct equity involvement in the monitored firm. This alternative is deemed as inappropriate to the American scene as is its
120 Berle, For Whom CorporateManagers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARv. L. REv.
1365 (1932); Dodd, For Whom Are CorporateManagers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L. REV.1145

(1932).
m See note 9 supra.
"' See also Adams, Zur Behandlung von Irrtlmern und Offenbarungspflichten im
Vertragsrecht, 108 ARCHIV FOR CIVILRECHT 453 (1986).
"$ Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 9,at 877.
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homegrown "LBO" counterpart, because, they assume, the
American institutional investor is fated to remain rooted in a
legal and political culture that dictates institutional ignorance
and institutional passivity. The preferred solution, then, is the
professional director who will bridge the gap between the governance and the ownership of public companies. 1 4
As I have already suggested, however, 1 5 the operational difference between the old director proposed by management to fill
the monitoring position, and the new director, proposed by
owner to manager to play that role, lies primarily in the recruitment channel and the pay scale. The old director is a current or
retired CEO of a noncompeting firm; the new director is an accountant, investment banker, or attorney, typically a member of
a firm whose principal function is to give legal or management
consulting advice to the management of the companies to be
monitored. At a time when the entire production sector of the
former German Democratic Republic is in the hands of a reorganization trustee (the Treuhandanstalt), staffed by a baffling-and baffled-mix of these old and new types,11 0 it is particularly beguiling to contemplate the role of these proposed
monitors.11 7 The comparison may be challenged, but I believe
that the few analogous experiences we have available, particularly the mentioned role of independent directors and independent counsel in disposing of derivative litigation, do not suggest
unbridled optimism about the role of the proposed professional
directors.

114They overlook, and I leave as a subject for another day, the problem well articuTm LAW ENDs 184-98 (1975). Stone argues that the most imlated in C. SToNE, WHEI
portant involvement of external (including owner) actors is below the level of a board of
directors. Recent European commentary, however, already has begun to reexamine this
issue from the specific perspective of institutional investment. See, e.g., Rehbinder,
Andere Organe der Unternehmensuerfassung,18 ZEMSCHRUT Pun UrrMs HMEr-S- UN
GEsu.LScHAmrSREcHT 305 (1989). For a first American look at this kind of institutional
solution, see Futter, An Answer to the Public Perception of Corporations:A Corporate
Ombudsperson?, 46 Bus. LAw. 29 (1990).
' See note 109 and accompanying text supra.
Compare Die Wollen gar Keine Hilfe, DER SPIEGEL, Sept. 1990, at 40 and Auf-

gabe Nicht Verstanden, WmrscHAmrswocaH,

Aug. 24, 1990, at 14 with the moderate

analysis of Christ, Wunder dauern etwas lWnger, Die Zeit, Nov. 16, 1990, at 7.
117 See the discussion of the role of independent counsel for independent directors'
litigation committees, at note 109 supra.
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C. The Comparative Contribution to the Governance Debate
We now have intimated that there are two arguments supporting a closer look at a more intimate, less "external" and adversary corporate governance relationship between the institutional investor and the firm. One derives from the privatization
hypothesis, the other from the all too briefly sketched "economic" hypothesis. Both rest on a politically shaped view of economic institutions and are not too concerned with the analytical
version of economic analysis of firms and markets that dominated recent discussions until real actors in real institutions confounded both its proponents and its critics.""8 Further, they have
this in common: they would make the issue of corporate governance, whether of the Lipton & Rosenblum or the Gilson &
Kraakman variety, dependent on the financial and economic role
of institutional investors, rather than making corporate governance the primary issue.
In this situation, a closer look at the relation between financial intermediation and corporate governance is more important
than, or at least logically precedes, a closer look at whether the
shareholder-paid professional director is a better director than
the president of a university, the retiring CEO of a neighboring
company, or the investment banker.
I believe it can be demonstrated that the LBO model is not
a variant of the German/Japanese banker model, but an essential definitional component of the latter. The banker model is
the expression of the historically contingent rise of finance capitalism to its current position of influence; the LBO model, in
turn, is a minor operational description of that banker model.
The "massive reassignment of equity to management," which to
Gilson & Kraakman is so critical a component of the American
model and of its distinguishability from the German/Japanese
model is, in economic terms at least, an accidental feature.""9 It
118See Buxbaum, The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate Governance, 73
CALIF. L. REV. 1671 (1985).

119 In historical/cultural terms, however, it may be more than an accidental feature;
indeed, it may be yet another indicator of some basic structural and behavioral differences between the European and American business and financial scenes. These differences may have more to say about appropriate structures of regulatory/self-regulatory,
prospective/retrospective, administrative/civil, and-generally-private/public societal
interaction with these sectors than differences explained in (more easily explainable)
economic terms.
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occurs at the time of transition from public company status to
private company status. It is neither a necessary nor a stable
element of the future operation of the LBO company, but simply a transfer payment to old management by the financial intermediary/sponsor of the transition, which in turn allows the
latter to make-and profit from-the changeover. The market
failure implicit in the opportunity of management to exact this
transfer toll probably can be traced to the background of the old
director type as much as to the conflict of interests inherent in
the financial intermediary structure, but that is another story.120
If this characterization is descriptively valid in rough terms,
then the far more critical inquiry is to compare the traditional
American corporate governance structure with the traditional
German one, and to identify the underlying features of financial
intermediation that explain the differences this comparison
reveals.121 By historical accident, the German Grossbank gained
its double foothold on the German corporate directorate first
through its role as veto-holding guest owner during the period of
hyperinflation, 1 22 then through its role as proxy-holder of publicly held shares, and finally through its ability to carry past
World War H its universal banking role of equity as well as
credit supplier to German firms. 2 3
An essential condition of this progression was and is the
tightly oligopolistic structure of the German major-bank sector,
which has its own quite contingent historical explanation. A second condition is the predominance in Germany of firms smaller
and less conglomerate than many American, British, and Japa-

See Crystal, Cracking the Tax Whip of C.E.O.s, N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1990 (Business World Supp. Magazine), at 48, 54; cf. Denis, Defensive Changes in CorporatePayout Policy: Share Repurchases and Special Dividends, 45 J. Fmo. 1433, 1453 (1990); see
also the sources cited in Instit'l Shareholder Services, Inc., Executive Pay - Up, Up,
and Away, 6 Issue ALERT, May 1991, at 1.
"' For the fairly analogous Japanese situation, see especially Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the JapaneseFirm, 28 J. EcoN. LRnnATUuE 1 (1990) and Sheard, The
Main Bank System in CorporateMonitoring and Controlin Japan, 11 J. EcoN. BmEHv.
& ORGANIZATION 399 (1989), also discussed in Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 9, at 27.
For a thorough general discussion, see THE JAPANEE FiNA CL SYsTEm (Y. Suzuld ed.
1987). For a recent US-Japan comparison, see M=RESCHwAm, note 75 supra.
122 See K. NtORP, Zwscnm'z DEN MOsmLSTrmN (1988).
113 The recent analysis in Roe, A PoliticalTheory of American CorporateFinance,
91 COLUM. L IREv. 10 (1991), fruitfully contrasts with the German situation the facts and
reasons for the fragmented role of banking and insurance institutions as corporate equity
120

owners.
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nese multinationals, firms that make their global mark more
through niche exploitation than through the broad-ranging
product line coverage typical of those other multinationals. That
institutional difference permits these firms to fit more readily
into the tightly organized universal Grossbanken structure than
would, say, a General Motors with its need to use public capital
markets even for commercial paper placement let alone for equity support. And a third reason may lie in the influence of the
German financial authorities, especially the Bundesbank, which
for policy reasons until recently wanted no expansion or institutional restructuring of money markets-and, by implication, of
capital markets-outside the framework of the Grossbanken.124
Whatever its provenance or reasons for enduring, the German
version of the institutional investor is the universal bank, which
by law may hold 25 percent of the common stock of any nonbanking firm, 125 and which through the tight proxy mechanism

known as the Depotstimmrecht (Depot) may control up to an
actual majority of the firm's voting stock.126 This institutional
investor, which as a financial intermediary moves savings to the
"2' See Schaede, Liberalization of Money Markets: A Comparison of Japan and
West Germany, 1989 J. INT'L EcON. STUDIES 25 (1989). On the actually developing role of
the mark and the yen in international capital markets, see, respectively, Tavlas, On the
International Use of Currencies: The Case of the Deutsche Mark (IMF Working Paper,
unpublished, Jan. 1990), and Tavlas & Ozeki, The Japanese Yen as an International
Currency (IMF Working Paper, unpublished Jan. 1991).
"z' The most frequently cited study is a governmentally commissioned one. See Bericht der Studienkommission (Gessler Kommission), Grundsatzfragen der Kreditwirtschaft, 28 SCHEFTENREIHE DES BUNDESMINISTERIUMS DER FINANZEN (1979). See also the
journalistic account in 1979 DER SPIEGEL, at 81.
For an earlier survey of actual bank participation in the stock ownership of German
firms, see G. PurrNER, DAs DEPOSTIMMRECHT DER BANKEN (1963), which also, as the title
implies, surveys the agency control available through the transfer of voting rights to
these banks by other shareholders. On the latter phenomenon and its legal as well as
factual basis, see W. VALLENTHIN, Dm STIMAMCHTSVERTRETUNG DURCH BANKEN NACH DEM
AKTiENGE5ETE VON (1965).
The recent (1989) debate centering around a proposal to reduce the maximum percentage of firm ownership by one bank to 5% is reviewed in Die Macht der Banken, 43
Z. GEs. KREDrrWESEN 1 (1990). For a brief English-language discussion, see Kallfass,
supra note 71.
.2 See the recent and detailed review of holdings and of voting power in Gottschalk,
Der Stimmrechtseinfluss der Banken in den Aktiontrsversammlungen von Grossunternehmen, 1988 WSI-MrrrEMUNGEN 294. As of the end of 1989, the three Grossbanken

held custody of over 44% of all domestic shares held by all financial institutions in Depot form, comprising a market value of approximately DM 300 billion. See AG-Report,
35 DIE AKTIENGESELLScHAFT R 378 (1990).
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German firm through both its equity and its debt channels,
plays a particularly important role in that firm, in part because
of the two-tier board structure that is a feature of the German
legal system. 127 It typically occupies one position and has at least

a crisis-activated influence on the occupancy of the other positions on the firm's supervisory council, the Aufsichtsrat. In
other words,- this investor can influence the filling of those positions (one-half the total) that the law does not assign to employees and thus leaves to shareholders to fill.1 28 It thus can strongly

influence, at least by veto if not by full power of initiative, the
choice of the CEO, and thereby, indirectly, the composition of
the second-tier managing board, the Vorstand. What managerial
strategies and decisions it does not formally control through
these ownership-related rights and powers it can influence
through its intimate and, as the "Hausbank," preferred if not
exclusive credit-extender position vis-h-vis the firm.2 0°
This powerful symbiosis was made possible by the availability of a stable, low-cost domestic deposit base unchallenged by
competitive investment opportunities. It has not gone unnoticed
or unchallenged in Germanyo3 and in neighboring states, and
127 See the recent comprehensive factual review in K. Fischer, Hausbankbeziehungen als Instrument der Bindung zwischen Banken und Unternehmen
(Diss., Bonn 1990) and the overview and evaluation in Baums, Banks and Corporate
Control Program in Law and Economics, University of California at Berkeley (Working
Paper No. 91-1) (unpublished 1991) (both on file at Boalt Hall Law Library).
128 The explanation by Werner, AufsichtsratstZatigkeit von Bankenuertretern,145 Z.
GEs. HANDELSRECHT 252, 253 (1981) emphasizes the minority role of "the" bank representative largely by pointing to the parity of labor members arising from the codetermination feature of German law. In fact, however, it is not the normal power of the executive
management to propose candidates but the ability to monitor this power that is at issue.
129 To this should be added the important role of cros-holdings of equity shares
among the large industrial firms themselves, which supports and is supported by this
banking sector interlock. For a recent critique specifically of this phenomenon, see
Monopolkommission, Gesellschaftsrecht und Konzentration, HAumTGUrTrAEN 19861
1987, 281 (1987). Cf., however, the review of more recent studies in Baums, supra note
74, concluding that the larger the client firm, the less significant any single bank, although also confirming that the "Big Three" collectively retain significant influence of
the type described in the text.
'11 Indeed, it is a favorite and enduring topic of debate in both its factual and normative implications. Of the postwar literature alone, see, e.g., E.J. MhSTrnAcIR. VEmwALTUNG, KONZMRGEWALT uND RECHTE DEE ArcnoNAn (1958); R. WEmTOLr'An IN=Essm
RE=
, -Lc.mA, Ah0.qXns-

UND ORGANISATION DER AKTIENGESELLSCHAPT IM AMERKANISCHFN UND DEUTSCHFN

(1961); G. RoTH, supra note 99, at 184; U.
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may yet be subject to erosion as a consequence of the liberalization of European capital markets and financial intermediation
systems attendant on "Europe 1992. ' ' 1s" One powerful legitimation of its existence and endurance, however paradoxical this
may seem at first glance, is the development of the parity concept of codetermination-Mitbestimmung-andthe participation by employees, in substantial part through their organized
labor representatives, in the governance structure of the German
firm. Winter's argument, more than a quarter-century ago, that
only an oligopolistically organized industrial sector could deal
with an oligopolistically organized labor sector (and vice versa)
in reciprocally satisfactory ways and with mutually acceptable
results,"3 2 finds strong confirmation in the German firm governance structure of today.
Earlier I sketched the primary consequences of this system
for the organized capital market of Germany and its limited absorptive capacity for foreign institutional investment, as well as
the secondary consequence that this saturation danger is beginning to express itself in the behavior of German firms vis-a-vis
the new, foreign institutions that would enter their ownership
universe via that market. Now, however, it is the more positive
role of labor participation in the guidance of, and thus in the
social legitimation of, the private-sector firm that I wish to explore for the comparative insights this labor participation may
shed on the relationship of the new institutional investor to the
governance of corporations.
D.

The Relation Between FinancialStructure and Corporate
Governance

This employee participation mechanism not only is embedded in the just described specific organizational relationship between the German finance and productive sectors, but in all
probability could not have been introduced and could not function except within the context of that specific relationship,

...On the other hand, it also has been recommended ai the appropriate European,
if not even American, form. See, e.g., Steinhjerr & Huveneers, Universal Banks: The
Prototype of Successful Banks in the Integrated European Market? A View Inspired by
German Experience, (1990).
232 Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust
Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE LJ. 14, 19 (1963).
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which itself of course is an expression of nationally specific older
and deeper economic, political, and social structures. One way to
examine its potential utility on the American scene, therefore, is
to examine the possible convergence between the underlying financial-economic organizations in the United States and
Germany.
If Jensen's privatization hypothesis is to be proved in practice, it will require the presence of strong private investors, able
and motivated to take "private-placement" positions next to

their investment banker counterparts. While the long-expected
and equally long-delayed arrival of universal banking in the
United States might be seen as one way to encourage the local
adaptation of the German structure, that overlooks the significant structural difference, in terms of number of competitive
units, between the two countries. It would take more consolidation of the American banking sector than anyone foresees before
that sector could begin to function with the minimum degree of
oligopolistic discipline that is the hallmark of the German
3
scene.

13

Nonetheless, the institutional investors, especially the large
pension funds, are in a position to fulfill at least a large part of
that private placement mission.1 34 Indeed they had been enthusiastically trying to do so during the LBO, MBQ, and defensive
recapitalization movements of the recent past.135 On balance, the

133 On the reasons for these different patterns of firm organization and their relation
to the roles of banks in primary capital formation and in secondary capital market development, see Tilly, Banking Institutions in Historical and Comparative Perspective:
Germany, Great Britain and the United States in the Nineteenth andEarly Twentieth
Century, 145 Z G s STAATsw 189 (1989).
For an interesting review of the relatively high proportion of friendly as against ho3tile takeovers even in the UK economy, and the reasons therefore, see Franks & Mayer,
CapitalMarkets and CorporateControf" A Study of France, Germany and the UK, 10
EcoN. POL'Y 192 (1990).
M34
Parker & Star, Partnerships Seek to Raise $8.6 Billion, PENsIoNs & INVESTMm s, Oct. 17, 1990, at 3, reviewing institutional investors' recent interest in this private
route, makes the additionally interesting point that new decision making or at least participation structures may evolve specifically through this form of intermediation: "Moreover, the partnerships are evolving into true joint business entures between the general
partners and their institutional partners. Some partnerships have set up... advisory
boards whose members include institutional partners. A few have begun inviting institutional partners to meetings with the top executives of the portfolio companies." See also
Roe, supra note 123, at 55, on the monitoring possibilities of more structured forms of
direct institutional investment.
"s' The current outcome of this suggests a salutary lesson about the desirability of
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Jensen scenario may still be deemed a highly questionable one
within the framework of the highly competitive financial intermediation sector that marks the American scene, and would
hardly yield the field to these new intermediaries without a
fight. Nevertheless, to the extent that the privatization scenario
has even a partly viable future, it would demonstrate some convergence with the German model, primarily because of the major
direct role institutional investors seem to be prepared and able
to play in that scenario.
Nonetheless, if the underlying social, political, and bureaucratic infrastructure for this kind of a role diverges as widely
between Germany and the United States as I have briefly suggested, and if the German version is itself as subject to structural change in its new liberal European context as I believe, a
skeptical attitude towards the "European" role proposed for the
American pension fund, and towards the governance patterns
growing out of that role, remains appropriate. Instead, other aspects of the German experience, aspects relating more directly
to the legitimacy of the German intermediation-and-governance
structure, may turn out to be more interesting analogies in our
search for the appropriate governance structure in the American
context. It is to these aspects that I would like to devote the
balance of this discussion.
This more attractive convergence hypothesis rests directly
on the growing congruence of the American public pension fund
segment of institutional investors and the German cohort of labor members of corporate boards-not in their role as capital
providers, which they do not share, but as participants in corporate governance. The German employee (Arbeitnehmer) enjoys
parity of representation on the first-tier supervisory council, the
Aufsichtsrat, subject only to the tie-breaking right of the representatives of shareholders. The employee participates in this
version of corporate governance on the basis of a social compact
that, however disputed its original emplacement may have been,
is supported today by a broad spectrum of political and economic forces. 136 It may not be directly capable of insinuation
moving these pension funds into the private intermediation role envisaged, or at least
necessitated, by the privatization hypothesis.
ISS See KfIbler, Book Review, 153 Z. Ga. HANDELSRECHT 496 (1988)(reviewing D,
REUTER. DIE MrBESTIMMUNO ALS BESTANDTEIL DES NORMATIVSYSTEMS FOR DIE JURISTIS-
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into American economic institutions because of the different underlying conditions that have already been mentioned, 137 but for
reasons specific to the American scene an American analogue
thereof is both attractive and feasible.
First of all, this employee participation is already a fact of
life. The current legal regime, not easily displaced, gives the
pension fund and other institutions the vote and thus the influence on management that its ownership share carries. While
pleas for "responsible" voting, for taking a "balanced time horizon" perspective, and similar calls may3 5 have some effect in
specific situations such as the tender of shares into a control bid,
they have little operational salience in the steady-state relationship of a bloc holder to its portfolio firms' management. Direct
political efforts simply to disenfranchise institutional investors
as somehow improper voteholders have been floated but have
little chance for success. Inside the velvet glove of jawboning
lurks a paper tiger, not an iron fist. The voting power of the
institutional investor, however encumbered by the constraints
on group activism that already have been enumerated, is clear
and present.
There is a more positive analogy in the experience of the
German system that labor-management cooperation need not be
a zero-sum game. While the large, particularly pension-related
institutional investor, because of portfolio distribution and index
strategy considerations, is locked into a permanent investment
in any given enterprise, this need not be seen only as a defect of
institutional investment. The employment-related mission of the
permanently invested pension fund also can have a positive efCHEN PERSONEN DES HmDEr.Lsanchrs (1987)).
137 In technical, legal terms of adaptability, see especially Summers, Cadetermination in the United States: A Projectionof Poblems and Potentials,4 J. Comp'. CoR". L.
& SEC. REG. 155 (1982). In legal-policy terms, see particularly the skeptical evaluation of
Vagts, Reforming the 'Modern'Corporation:Perspectivesfrom the German, 80 HAR. L.
REv. 23, 36 (1966); cf. Conard, The Supervision of CorporateManagement:A Comparison of Developments in European Community and United States Law, 82 MICH. L, Rav.
1459, 1485 (1984). In more social-theoretical terms, compare Teubner, IndustrialDemocracy Through Law?, in CoNTRACT AND ORGAIZATION: LEGAL ANALYSis IN tE LIGHT OF
ECONOMIC AND SocIAL THEORY 261 (T. Daintith & G. Teubner eds. 1986) with Stone,
Labor and the CorporateStructure: Changing Conceptions and Emerging Possibilities,
55 U. Cm. L. REv. 73, 161 (1988).
138 See the panoply of these calls reviewed in Buxbaum, supra note 8, at 24.
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fect on the enterprise mission and the enterprise management,13s
and, beyond that, on the public or societal interest.
This is the place to complete the earlier discussion of the
social need for new time frames as well as new priorities if overriding questions of ecological survival are to be better answered
within the liberal economic framework of modern free enterprise
systems than they were in the socialist framework of state enterprise systems. As I. indicated, this paradigmatic shift in the
frame of reference for private firm behavior needs an ideological
legitimation, and I believe that the German codetermination
system provides at least a starting point for that search.
American analogues to codetermination should begin not
with their substance but with the evolution of organizational
forms within which the new substantive proposals might take
root. The beginning, of course, is in the shift from insider boards
to outsider boards, from the old Standard Oil model of nine senior executives and one investment banker to Harold Williams's
ideal of nine pillars of the professions, the business community,
and the society, tempered only by the Chief Executive Officer of
the firm. This is where the representatives of substantial institutional investors can find their first place.
But it is only one place, and they as owners are only one
representative among others, even if more insistent and capable
of achieving and holding that place than are those other guest
monitors invited and subject to replacement (except in times of
crisis) by their host, the CEO. It is here, incidentally, that the
professional representative directors proposed by Gilson &
Kraakman 140 find their place. It is here, too, that an American
version of the European Community's proposed Fifth Company
Law Directive,14 1 creating an internal functional split between
inside managing and outside monitoring directors sitting on the
142
same board, might be considered.
The second step in the organizational evolution begins to

...This view to some degree also underlies European discussions of efforts to provide employee-owners participation rights in enterprises outside the traditional board
structures. See, e.g., Loritz, Arbeitnehmerbeteiligungenund Verbandssouveriinitit, 15
Z. UNTERNEHMENS- u. GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 310 (1986).
10 See supra note 9.
1'
Commission of the European Communities, Amended Proposalfor a Fifth Directive, 26 O.J. Eup. Comm. No. C 240, art. 3 (Aug. 19, 1983).

"' See Conard, supra note 6, at 139.
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look more like the two-tiered board model familiar in Germany.
One version, a managerialist one, recently was floated by Lipton
and Rosenblum: a board comprised principally of outside directors, all elected for a five-year term of office, all nominated, not
only ratified, by the shareholders, and all campaigning on the
basis of a strategic plan for the corporation that could include,
and that would be the exclusive channel for, a takeover bid or
other auction or recapitalization proposal. 143 Putting aside its

admitted origin as a management-insulation device (for reasons
that some call good and some call bad), it is interesting in the
present context in that it hints at a two-tier system. This is a
board of shareholder representatives, inevitably dominated by
institutional investors in control of the proxy solicitation mechanism. It implies the structured appointment of, and a structured
relation with, a management that probably would evolve to be
similar to a Vorstand, if only because of the inherently strict
separation of this shareholder council from the management
function. This separation is predictable, since the focus on basic
corporate strategy as the core of the quinquennial election process presumably dictates the use of fund managers and financial
advisors as board nominees. Financial sector specialists rather
than neighboring CEOs would be the typical candidates. The
continuity of shareholder representatives as directors would be
compromised if investment (and disinvestment) turnover rates
were too high; most larger institutional investors, however, not
only the public pension ones, have moved towards a passive investment portfolio strategy to the point that they have the requisite continuity of investment for this purpose.14 4
A second version, an institutional one, is the shareholders'
advisory council, propounded by representatives of institutional
investors.1 45 This would leave the existing board of directors in

place, but also transmute it over time into an analogue of the
German second-tier board, the Vorstand, for reasons not so dissimilar to the first. The "upper" council's substantive functions
might well remain more limited and more hortatory than in the

14'Lipton & Rosenblum,

supra note 92, at 224.

See Brancato Report, supra note 58, especially Exhibit 16 (Turnover of Institutional Holdings in Top 50 Corporations) and Exhibit 17 (Annual Percent Turnover of
144

Equity Holdings) at 69.

M For a review of these variants, see Taylor, Can Big Owners Make a Big Differ-

ence?, supra note 78.
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managerial version; and if unduly limited they might well justify
the Gilson & Kraakman criticism of advisory councils per se as
paper tigers.' " Its inevitable and legitimate control of the proxy
process for the election of directors, however, would move it towards institutionalizing itself, in time leading to a separation of
governance functions between that council and the now
subordinate board of directors,1 47 and to a more explicit and stable equilibrium between the increasingly divergent calls for
shareholder wealth maximization and "corporate" wealth
maximization. 4
In any event, whichever variant were taken, this new structured separation of supervisory and managerial functions would
provide the basis for operationalizing a somewhat more public or
socially oriented version of long-range decision making within
the traditional liberal economic framework of corporate governance. While I have styled one managerial and one institutional
in provenance and motivation, the only hard difference between
them is the five-year insulation of management built into the
former. So far as their susceptibility or amenability to institutional investor control is concerned, there would seem to be little
difference between them. Each escapes the limitations of present-day unitary boards, which combine the worst of both
worlds in being neither close enough to operational management
to control it effectively nor detached enough to offer a different
perspective. 4 9 These structural variants, therefore, should permit more effective monitoring than would a "professional direc1

See note 9 supra, at 871.

An interesting insight into this evolution is provided by Windbichler, Zur Trennung von Geschaftsflhrung und Kontrolle bei amerikanischenGrossgesellschaften, 14
Z. UNTERNEsMENS- u. GEsELSCHAFTSRECHT 50 (1985), who sees a de facto turn towards
split-board systems inthe trend towards board committees and their specialization in
control as well as in information development.
148 See especially Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Invest17

ment, 38 UCLA L. REv. 277, 368 (1990), proposing an owners' "Intrinsic Value Commit-

tee" for this purpose.
M4Indeed, one inherent rebuttal of the-Gilson & Kraakman argument lies in their
implicitly ignoring what by common consensus is understood to be the inherent inability
of any board of directors to be more than distant monitors of the self-set goals of executive management. See M. EISENBERG, THE STuCrUR OF THE MODERN CORPORATION 162
(1976). I realize Eisenberg at that time also rejected the adaptability of the German
"two-tier" model to the American scene, id. at 177, but fifteen years ago his argument
could not take into account the institutional ownership considerations that lead me to
resume the discussion.
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tor" plan with its minimal professional intrusion into a board

otherwise left with its present structure, functions, and processes

intact. 150
E.

The Mutual Legitimation of Management and Ownership
The second part of the prescription is more difficult to

render operational, but in the long run perhaps more important
both to the postulated new mission of corporate management

and to the continuing legitimacy of the American form of pension funding itself. If the new pension fund intermediaries are to
lend legitimacy to new public and private law versions of effec-

tive enterprise functioning, indeed if they are themselves to remain insulated from the inevitable erosion of their funding sup-

port as legislators discover the possibilities of cheating on the
contribution or payout obligations at the margin, they themselves need to be legitimate. 151 That need implies participation
by their beneficiaries in the formation of the policies that in
turn are to be transmitted to and imposed upon firms.

On both counts-the operational realities of new firm governance with new representatives and new or more complex mis-

sions, and the operational realities of bringing the voice of beneficiaries to bear on the decisions of the funds-European,
especially German, law turns out to have surprisingly detailed
relevance. While it is not possible at the conclusion of this long

discussion to provide proof of this in detail, I have singled out
two regimes or systems that bear particularly close examination,
one at the corporate and one at the fund level.
I The reader, of course, always should be aware of the "grass is greener" phenomenon. This may be the place to note the interest in the American unitary board system
expressed by some German writers concerned with defects in the supervision, especially
at times of crisis, available through the German two-tier system. (They do not, however,
focus on the institutional investor.). See K BLmcHE , D. Lnsm & IL PAUL, UNTERNEHMUNGSVERFASSUNG UND SPrZENORGANISATION: FOHRUNG UND UBERVACHUNG VON
AKTIENGESELLCHAFTEN W1 INTERNATIONALEN VERGLF.CH (1989); cf. Theisen, Das BoardModel" Ltsungsansatz zur Uberwindung der "Uberwachungslilche"in deutschen Ahtiengesellschaften?, 34 Dmn AKMNGESELLSCHAT 161 (1989).
"' Indeed, one political response to the claims of institutional investors, especially
public pension funds, is to question their legitimacy exactly on this point of beneficiary
participation in decision making. See, e.g., Lochner, The Current Debate Concerning
Proxy Reform, Remarks to the Tenth Annual Ray Garrett Jr. Corporate and Securities
Law Institute, Stamford, Conn., SEC News Release (May 24, 1990) ("But if democracy is
such a good thing for a corporation... shouldn't institutional shareholders be required
to pass proxy voting rights through to the real beneficial owners of the shares?").
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The first is the already mentioned regime of labor
codetermination at the board level with which the German legal
and political system, otherwise in a liberal economic mold reasonably close to the American one, has had considerable practical experience. The salience of that experience to the issue of
the institutional investors' legitimacy is the light it casts on
what we still believe to be the formal conflict of interests between labor and capital, each a factor supplier whose short-run
benefit necessarily entails a short-run detriment to the other.
The German experience in working out this conflict at the operational board of directors level demonstrates that the operative
issue is not this "conflict of interests" but the value added by
persons with somewhat different views of the world to the
board's decisions. In one sense, this suggests that the entire cohort of labor representatives is little different from the spectrum
of persons ranging from public figures of various persuasions to
reasonably reflective lawyers, accountants, and bankers, surrounding the cohort of CEOs on the typical American board of
directors.
The German experience also is salient in demonstrating that
the structural or organizational stretching-out of the decisionmaking hierarchy over two tiers provides the important tempering effect of time horizons to the decisional output. I highlight
both points, however, for a different reason: legitimation is a
two-way street. The responsible behavior of the labor representatives legitimates them and the entire institution of
codetermination just as their involvement in the firm's decisions
legitimates the management of the firm to its constituents and
its society. The issue is not conflict versus harmony, but mutual
adaptation of values and strategies to mitigate the burden of inevitable conflict.
F. The Decision-Making Structure of the Institutional
Investor
The second comparative aspect of legitimating the institutional investor, especially the pension fund, to fulfill its role as
genuine participant in corporate governance, lies in the appropriate organization of its own decision-making structure and
processes. We have already reviewed and, I trust, discarded the
option of disenfranchising these portfolios entirely, though this
is an option that has tantalized some participants in the current
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debate 152 and, indeed, has a surprisingly long history in the
a
American discussion. 15
We also can put aside the question of the pass-through of
portfolio voting power to investors in mutual funds and other
voluntary investment vehicles. The listed or other publicly
traded investment company legitimates the exercise of its voting
power in two ways: by the monitoring effect of the price for its
shares, and by the existence of market choice for investment vehicles of varying investment philosophies. While neither is ideal
as a legitimating vehicle for the exercise of the franchise, these
two market exits go some way towards alleviating the "bureaucratic power-exercise" legitimacy problem. They go even further
when coupled with improved disclosure of voting philosophy and
of actual votes'" and with improved control of the conflict of
interests inherent in the transfer of the voting power to the investment adviser or fund manager with myriad other relationships with the firms in the portfolio.
The interesting legitimation question involves the collective
pension funds and their governance by means of beneficiary participation including, but by no means limited to, portfolio voting
power pass-through procedures. Internal analogues to the market choice provided by investment companies are not available.
The collective nature of the savings decision is not, conceptually
speaking, a categorical obstacle (note the increasing flexibility
and variety of investment choices nowadays available at least to
participants in supplemental pension plans), but it is an obstacle. The difficulty is compounded when market valuation issues
are added, since these funds are not intended to be available for
$600 BM.11ON BURDEN, supra note 104.
See, e.g., R. TILOvE, supra note 2, at 82.

152 See, e.g., THE
153

15 See, for example, the recently enacted CAI. CORP. CODE § 711 (West 1990), requiring such trustees to keep records of their voting decisions and to make them availa-

ble to beneficiaries and their representatives.
The Department of Labor recently proposed legislation to mandate disclosure of the
proxy voting policy by plans subject to ERISA, thus moving towards the California ap-

proach. See Dep't of Labor, Proposed Section 104(b) (4) Submission to Congrfs3 (Oct. 26,
1990) ("The Administrator shall furnish.... (B) For plan years beginning on or after
January 1, 1991, upon written request of any participant or beneficiary, a copy of the
voting policy of any person responsible for exercising any voting rights of securities held
by the plan or directing the exercise of any such voting rights.") See also Statement of
David George Ball, Assistant Secretary for Pension and Welfare Benefits, US. Dep't of
Labor, Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Labor and
Human Resources (July 24, 1990).
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removal via a market but only for lump-sum or periodic payout
in the retirement context. In any event, as is the case with voluntary investment, market choices and valuations are an awkward surrogate for the political aspect of the problem, namely,
the legitimation of the exercise of an enormous voting franchise
by the appointed agent of two principals, the settlor and the
beneficiary.
Voice or governance mechanisms are the question, and the
special but central case of the pass-through of the franchise is
the arena within which it can be posed. The direct pass-through
on the analogy of the street name or Depotstimmrecht holder or,
in the pension context, on the analogy of the famous Sears Roebuck Company employee stock holdings,15 is not an easy solution. One obstacle is the lack of direct correspondence between
the legal title of the trustee to specific stocks and the beneficial
interest of the employee to a fungible portion of the res. On the
other hand, the more stable the portfolio, the more feasible it
should become to provide the beneficiary with a pro-rata vote on
the ESOP model, which then, as to each issuer's stock in the
portfolio, is transmuted into a set number of votes per
beneficiary.
This, however, while itself a heroic assumption, does not resolve two problems specific to pension funds. Even if the portfolio remains stable, the beneficiary's share (which in any event is
contingent on the future event of retirement or at least of vesting) does not; rather, it varies with time in service and with the
shifting size of the beneficiary universe. Of course, it is not essential that the pass-through be exact; surrogates for weighted
voting such as past contributions or years of service would at
least provide an approximate fair share of the franchise.
The difficult problem, rather, is that the pooled investment
is dedicated to periodic retirement income or lump-sum annuity
purchase payments, a purpose incompatible with the split voting
outcome created by ordinary pass-through mechanisms. 150 Split
voting by a sole agent for different beneficiaries is common in
traditional nominee situations, but leads simply to the aggregation of an ultimate majority-decided firm decision. 157 Dissidents

' '
5
157

For a brief description of this episode, see R. TmovE, supra note 2, at 60.
See Buxbaum, supra note 8, at 27.

Id. See, however, Smith, Voting in Contested Elections, 5

PRENTICE HALL L. &
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are comforted not only by exit opportunities through a market
but, above all, by the fact that their original investment is voluntary. If these beneficiaries' participation in the development
of the intermediary's portfolio governance (as well as investment) strategy is to be treated as a matter of right and not of
privilege, however, the difference in the two investment situations needs to be respected. In other words, the deference to majority rule implied by a voluntary investment cannot without
more be transposed to the collective savings/investment situation implied in the pension situation.
Two approaches then commend themselves. One is to require these beneficiaries to draw the consequences of their individual decisions on these matters, much as the employee-participant in a voluntary pension scheme today can choose investment
vehicles but then must live with that choice. In the long run,
that implies the development of separate pension-investment
pools if, as is likely, some of these decisions (such as takeover
defenses or environmental constraints on product lines) have investment consequences. 15 8 Apart from the political problem assumed (too readily) to arise from the abandonment of paternalistic concern with private choices, however, the complex,
attenuated, and dubious correlation of the slow cumulation of
vote choices over time with ultimate market value designations
for pensions renders this approach both cumbersome and more
confusing than supportive of the legitimation purpose of the
exercise.

159

A second, time-honored approach, 6 therefore, would be the
interposition of intermediate employee institutions specifically
Bu&

INSIGHTS

25 (1991) (describing the pitfalls of split voting).

'" An analogous flexibility already exists for the voluntary supplemental benefit
plan, for which the computer makes the provision of a number of specific investment
rationales, and even of personal, directly managed plans, feasible.
"' For a brief discussion of "directed voting rights," including the radical notion of
a special auction, see U.S. Dep't of Labor, Office of Pension and Welfare Benefit Programs, Public Hearing on Corporate Governance 155, 159 (Jan. 10, 1985).
.'rime-honored"
not only by reference to collective bargaining, but specifically
by reference to detailed proposals of an earlier day concerned with the development and
transferability of vested firm-level pensions for an increasingly mobile American
workforce. One complex proposal was to transfer the voting rights inhering in the investment portfolio to the public agency that was to be responsible for guaranteeing the pension payments (ie., to a precursor of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation!). See M.
Bm NsT

,THE FTrruRE oF PmvATE PFsIoNs 293 (1964).
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designed to elicit and transmit employee views on these matters
to the portfolio-voting intermediaries. The elected business
agent of the union, in those sectors which still boast of unions, is
the obvious model for this institution. Here, too, the German experience with employee intermediaries and with their selection
would be instructive.
The present American situation is not satisfactory from this
perspective. In the private employer sector, the monitoring provided by ERISA and its concern with the exercise of the
franchise attached to an investment portfolio may be a warrant,
albeit an indirect warrant, against flagrant agent abuses, 161 but it
does little for the underlying legitimation of the role of these
large funds in the first place. In the public sector, the lack of a
relationship between the public employment setting of the beneficiaries and the private employment setting of the portfolio
firms further attenuates the sense of involvement that is the beginning of a sense of legitimation. 162 The rest is done by the

sheer size and distance from the workplace of most of these institutions. This makes them more susceptible to the legitimate
but conflict-ridden intrusion of legislative and administrative
political interests-the "settlors"-than
amenable to the partici1 3
pation of the beneficiaries.

New York's recent experience, both with the legislative
deferral of premium payments through actuarial juggling 6 4 and
with the executive's attempted use of the Task Force Report to
justify pension investment in social infrastructure,10 5 should suf161 See, e.g., PROXY VOTING OF PENSION PLAN EQUITY SECURITIES (Dan McGill ed.
1989); Buxbaum, supra note 8, at 20.
162 See generally R. TELovE, PUBLIC EMPLOYEE PENSION FUNDS (1976).
10 See the discussion of these conflicts more than a decade ago in PENSION TASK

FORCE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON LABOR STANDARDS, HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, 94THl
CONG., 2D SESS., INTERIM REPORT ON ACTIVIrIES (Comm. Print 1976); more generally, see
L. KoHLMEiER, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST:. STATE AND LOCAL PENSION FUND ASSET MANAGE-

MENT (1976).

'" See Barbanel, Pension Shift for Teachers is Questioned, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11,
1990, at B1, col. 5.
165 GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON PENSION FUND INVESTMENT (N.Y.), OUR MONEY'S
WORTH: THE REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON PENSION FUND INVESTMENT

(1989). New York was not alone in floating this approach, though it was the first major
one to use it, when the New York City Teachers' Retirement Fund bailed New York City
out of bankruptcy. See Note, Public Employee Pensions in Times of FiscalDistress, 90
HARv. L. REv. 992, 1006 (1977). During Governor Edmund (Pat) Brown's administration,
California organized a Governor's Public Investment Task Force, later converted into the
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fice as a cautionary reference against unreflective continuation
of the present situation. 6 Some protection against these inroads exists in the constitutional prohibition against the impairment of contracts, 67 but this is a crude control, too uncertain in
its potential application. 68 Paradoxically, it is often too harsh
when applied, especially because of the difficulty of distinguish-

ing an actual reduction of benefits from reductions caused by
variations in the prefunding formulae' at times when strong
funded positions7 0 collide with weak current account positions of
the public fisc.

Pension Investment Unit, which identified the pension plan investment patterns of various governmental units, and proposed a large.scale use of their investments for social
purposes. See CALIFORNIA GOvERNOR'S PUBUC INESzr&MENT TAsK FoRcM FINAL REPORT
(1981); STATE OF CALIFORNIA, OFFICE OF PuANmo AND REsEARCH. TARGINO INVET 'rMNT
FOR ECONOMIC D vLophxENi' PENSION INVESTMENT UNIT ANNUAL REPORT

(1982); See also

Savage, Brown's Push for Risk in Pension-FundInvestments, CALIF. J. July 1981, at
258. Other states, including Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Wisconsin also looked at
these issues a decade ago. See R. MESSINGER, REVITALZING NEW YoRx CITY's EcoNo.sY
17 (1980).
For a current overview of this situation in the United States, see INsTInum FOR FzDUCIARY EDUCATION. ECONOMICALLY TARGETED INETMENTS (1989). See also the critique
and case studies in SOCIA INVESTING (D. McGill ed. 1984).
"I See particularly Black, supra note 15, at 598.
1'67See generally Taylor, supra note 78.
1 Compare Dombrowski v. City of Philadelphia, 431 Pa. 199, 245 A.2d 238 (1963)
with Kosa v. Treasurer of State of Michigan, 408 Mich. 356, 292 N.W.2d 452 (1980) and
AFSCME Councils 6, 14, 65 and 96, AFL-CIO v. Sundquist, 338 N.W.2d 560 (Minn.
1983) - and the last, in turn, with Christensen v. Minneapolis Mun. Employees Retirement Bd., 331 N.W.2d 740 (inn. 1983).
Especially instructive is Knight v. Board of Admin., 223 Cal. App. 3d 527, 273 Cal.
Rptr. 120 (1990), in which the clear repudiation by the legislature of an unconscionable
windfall benefit inadvertently created by prior legislation is correctly but almost incoherently upheld against an impairment-of-contract challenge.
'" See, e.g., Birnbaum v. New York State Teachers Retirement Sys., 5 N.Y.2d 1,
152 N.E.2d 241, 176 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1958). On this problem of actuarial assumptions, including their accounting conventions, see Friedman, supra note 38.
170 See California State Teachers' Ass'n v. Cory, 155 Cal. 3d 494, 202 Cal. Rptr. 611
(1984); Valdes v. Cory, 139 Cal. 3d 773, 189 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1983); Dadisman v. Moore,
384 S.E.2d 816 (W. Va. 1989). See generally the criticism of Allied Structural Steel Co. v.
Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978) (state intrusion on employers' obligation under private
pension arrangement) and its reading of United States Trust Co. of New York v. New
Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977), in L. TRIBE, AhmuCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 622 (2d ed. 1988).
The larger issue, of course, is that of intergenerational equity, given the free ride of
the first generation of pension plan beneficiaries (at least under governmental plans) and
the risk of slower population growth over time. For recent discussions of this aspect of
the "continuing funding" problem, see Feldstein, Should Private Pensions Be Indexed?,
in FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE UNIrTE STATES PENSION SYSTEM, supra note 38, at 211-27;
Merton, On Consumption Indexed PublicPension Plans, in same, at 259; and the vivid
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It is therefore critical to foster beneficiary-guided or at least
beneficiary-influenced fund management structures, and to learn
from the experience of those public funds that are structured to
provide this guidance from elected representatives. If the interposition of intermediate employee-beneficiary institutions can
help avoid the temptation of excessive settlor involvement with
the creation and especially the use of these funds, this alone
would justify the effort to devise appropriate forms of that intermediation. If in addition these structures can help funds avoid
the charge of illegitimacy in their interaction with their portfolio
firms, the case for support of fund advisory or managing boards
substantially elected by their beneficiaries would seem clear. '
The foregoing discussion has been limited to the legitimation of pension investments as active owners within the framework of traditional liberal economic terms of reference. The direct use of pension assets for "non-pension" distributions to the
beneficiaries, however, also is a matter of public concern, though
it is not the subject of this paper. It implicates similar issues of
participation in decision-making. While it is as tempting as it is
financially problematical, the alternative of using (at least private sector employer) pension funds for direct investment in social assets specific to the workforce, such as employee housing or
even own-firm takeovers,172 cannot even be seriously discussed
in the absence of legitimation of such decisions through particireview in Samuelson, Comment (on Merton), in same, at 276.
7 See, e.g., California Public Employees' Retirement System Law, CAL GOV'T CODE
§ 20100 (West Supp. 1991), creating a Board of Administration of 13 members, six
elected by the active and retired members of the system and its affiliate systems, all
serving four-year terms, id. § 20101, in whom the management and control of the system
is vested, id. § 20103.
The current tendency of British systems to recede from membership-elected board
structures in the private sector is marked and criticized in L. HANNAH, supra note 25, at
140. It is interesting, however, that conservative policy analysts have been making a con.
certed effort to shift most schemes to defined contribution form on the explicit ground
that this passes through to the individual employee-beneficiary the property interest,
including the voting right, in this component of the wage/pension package. Id. at 141. On

the recent changes, see Creedy & Disney, The New Pension Scheme in Britain, in THlE
ECONOMICS OF SOCIAL SECURITY 224 (A. Dilnot & I. Walker eds. 1989); Creedy & Disney,
The 'Twin-Pillar' Approach to Social Insurance in the UK, 36 SCOTTSH J. POL. EcoN,.
113 (1989).
172 See, e.g., the discussion in M. WEISS, PENSION FUND INVESTMENTS: THE ISSUE OF
CONTROL (1978), reprinted in 5 CENTR FOR ECONOMIC STUDIES, STUDIES IN PENSION

FUND INVESTMENTS (1981).
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pation in their making by the pension beneficiaries.7 3
There is a larger issue at stake here, namely, the secular
change of the American labor-firm relationship from one characterized by unionization and collective adversarial behavior to a

more involuted and reciprocally entangled one. If corporate
domination of that situation is not to freeze into a temporarily

attractive but eventually destabilizing form of political corporatism, nonpaternalistic structures of employee-employer relations,
especially in this area of post-retirement support, will have to

evolve. 174 In our own search for that path the European experience is not necessarily a model to emulate, but it is a setting to

reflect on, a setting whose positive as well as negative lessons
may provide some illumination for that search.

M7
In the case of public sector pension funds, a mild version of this variation, e.g.,
lending fund assets to fund members for residential home purchases, is both politically
interesting and, because of direct legislative participation, politically legitimate. See, eg.,
California Public Employees' Retirement System Law, CAL. Govh"CODE § 20215 (West
Supp. 1991). The same may be said of politically (legislatively) mandated divestment of
shares of firms doing business in South Africa. Broader mandates and prohibitions, of
course, become more problematical.
It is interesting that one English critic separately identified public pension funds,
with their direct (and therefore legitimate) political base within an elected local authority, as the only type of entity that might risk innovative investment in local enterprise
development; however, because of the general statutory duty of public pension funds to
take expert advice on their investment policy, it would be "important to invite sympathetic experts on to the paneL[!]" R. MnAs, supra note 4, at 160-62.
174 And this despite Drucker's fears that[F]or labor.., to try to use pension fund socialism as a means to expand
union power by becoming the representative of the employees in their role as
principal owners .... [is] fraught with grave risk for the American trade
union .... [because it] can only aggravate the already existing threat to the
cohesion of the union: the tug of war between the younger workers and the
older members.
P. DRUCKER, supra note 3, at 142. Compare the view of the "paraproprietal society" of
pension-owning workers (and their relation to their firms) in P. HAmREcm,. PENsio
FuNDs AND ECONOMIC PowER 285 (1959).

